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INTRODUCTION
One of the most hotly contested and divisive issues in recent international trade law centers on whether the reclassification of multi-purpose
vehicles constitutes a violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).' The automobile industry is often a susceptible target in
trade disputes between the major industrialized powers-particularly
between the United States and Japan.2 There is, however, much to lose
by bringing potentially divisive automobile dumping and reclassification
issues to the domestic and international forefront.3 The United States
auto industry's efforts to adopt protectionist trade measures such as the
reclassification of multi-purpose vehicles and to support anti-dumping
actions against minivans Japan exports to the United States puts additional pressure on a divided Clinton Administration to take some sort of

1. See Letter from Robert C. Cassidy, Jr., Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, to William E. Barreda, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade and Investment Policy, United
States Department of the Treasury 7 (Feb. 14, 1992) [hereinafter Cassidy Letter] (on
file with author) (asserting that while multi-purpose vehicle, sport utility vehicle, and
minivan reclassification would not constitute a violation of any GATT article, tariff
rule, or convention, the law in the United States remains unsettled regarding the proper method of classification).
2. See David R. Sands, U.S. Imported Car Dealers Fear Trade War Will Target
Their Stock, WASH. TIMEs, May 20, 1993, at Cl (stating that in 1992, nearly three
quarters of the fifty billion dollar United States trade deficit with Japan resulted from
automobile and automobile parts sales and that minivans "can be dragged into seemingly unrelated trade disputes"); see also Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the
Antidumping Laws, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 491, 520 (1993) (decrying that the
United States automobile industry is an outstanding example of a special interest
group's utilization of the government to secure needed protection from foreign automobile manufacturers).
3. See Van Dumping Charge Offers Big 3 a Huge Victory-or Disaster, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, June 10, 1991, at 12 (asserting that an unsuccessful anti-dumping
action by Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors could lead to a dramatic change in enforcement actions in United States trade policy or to a growing consumer perception
that the United States automobile industry is raising frivolous claims because it cannot
compete effectively against foreign automobile manufacturers).
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action on this politically sensitive issue.' The Treasury Department remains unreceptive to suggestions from the "Big Three" to reexamine and
reverse its earlier 1989 classification decision.' Recently, Congress introduced several resolutions regarding the reclassification of multi-purpose
vehicles, minivans and sport utility vehicles that increase the likelihood
that this 6 unsettling issue may come to the political and international
forefront.

4. See Max Gates, Clinton to Decide Minivan Tariffs, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, May
3, 1993, at 8 (stating that the Clinton Administration remains sharply divided on the
multi-purpose vehicle reclassification issue). Former Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen
was opposed to raising the tariff on multi-purpose vehicles from 2.5% to 25%7, while
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and United States Trade Representative Mickey
see also A Close Call For Suzuki, THE
Kantor support raising the tariff rate. Id.;
NAT'L J., Feb. 29, 1992, at 489 (reporting that a Treasury Department proposal to
reclassify multi-purpose vehicles lost momentum due to "staunch opposition within the
department, from other government agencies and from Washington lobbyists" representing the Japanese automobile industry); Mark Rechtin, Imports: 25% Tariff Killed
2-door Market, AUTOMOTIVE NEWs, Mar. 29, 1993, at 37 (reporting that President
Clinton called the 1989 Treasury Department reclassification decision a "S300 million
freebie" to the Japanese automobile industry and, if reversed, would dramatically
increase United States tariff collection revenues); Sands, supra note 2, at Cl (same).
But see Max Gates, Importers Bolster Defenses as Clinton Focuses on Tariffs, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Nov. 16, 1992, at 4 (reporting that the Japanese automobile industry
challenges the claims that raising the tariff on multi-purpose vehicles from 2.511 to
25% would lead to hundreds of millions in additional revenues because the higher
tariff would serve to reduce Japanese vehicle sales in the United States, and would
therefore, significantly reduce United States tariff revenues); Max Gates, Tariff Hike
Sought for Imported Minivans, Four-Door Sport Utilities, AUTOMOTIVE NEws, Feb.
17, 1992, at 4 (stating that opponents of reclassification assert that a tariff increase
from 2.5% to 25% "will very likely reduce [United States] tariff earnings to zero"
due to a lack of imported vehicle competitiveness).
5. See Max Gates, Japanese Blunt Big 3 Offensive on Tariffs, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS, Mar. 1, 1993, at 1 (reporting that a meeting among representatives of the
United States automobile industry, the United Auto Workers, and Treasury Secretary
Bentsen failed to secure a Treasury Department reclassification pledge).
6. See H.R. Res. 228, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (proposing to amend the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States in order to classify certain trucks as
motor vehicles for the transport of goods rather than as motor vehicles for the transport of persons under the tariff schedule and to increase their tariff rate from 2.551 to
25%); see also H.R. Res. 1369, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing the "Minivan
Tariff Consumer Protection Act of 1993," drafted to reduce the tariff rate on imported
minivans if they are reclassified at a higher duty rate and if imported minivan prices
rise at a rate above the rate of inflation); S. Res. 385, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(proposing to redesignate Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States notes two
and three and to reclassify certain minivans, sport utility vehicles, multi-purpose vans,
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The Clinton Administration faces the difficult task of balancing its
concern for the welfare of the United States auto industry with implementing free and fair international trade policies.7 This Comment examines the use of protectionist trade measures, such as the reclassification
of multi-purpose vehicles, sport utility vehicles, and minivans, and the
United States auto industry's efforts to bring anti-dumping actions
against Japanese minivans. This Comment also addresses whether such a
reclassification is illegal under the GATT and examines the consequences of bringing an action before a GATT dispute settlement panel.
Part I of this Comment surveys the history of the minivan reclassification and dumping disputes. Part II examines the multi-purpose vehicle
and minivan reclassification issue. Part IH explores the International
Trade Commission's (ITC) dumping investigation of Japanese minivans.
Part IV examines whether multi-purpose vehicle or minivan reclassification is consistent with United States obligations under the GATT and
considers the likely outcome if Japan invokes the dispute resolution
mechanism under GATT Article XXM. Part V draws conclusions and

and other vehicles less than five metric tons "designated primarily for purposes of
transportation of property . . . equipped with special features enabling offstreet or offhighway operations and uses . . . suitable for cargo-carrying purposes or other nonpassenger purposes" as motor vehicles for the transport of goods rather than persons
under the HTSUS heading 8704); S. Res. 2145, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (proposing to "assure mutually advantageous international trade in motor vehicles and motor
vehicle parts," to advance the "interstate sale and export" of U.S. motor vehicles and
parts, and to promote American jobs); S. Res. 3081, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)
(proposing to reclassify under HTSUS heading 8704 "any passenger van, multipurpose
van, [and] sport utility vehicle" less than five metric tons which is designed primarily
for transporting property, "equipped with special features" allowing for off-road use,
or "suitable for cargo-carrying purposes or other non-passenger-carrying purposes" by
removing manufacturer's seats for the purpose of creating "a flat floor level surface"
from the "forwardmost point of installation" to the end of the vehicle's rear interior);
H.R. Res. 3250, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposing to amend the notes of the
Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States in order to reclassify light trucks or
light duty trucks from HTSUS heading 8703 to 8704); S. Res. 1646, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) (proposing the same).
7. See President Clinton's Submission to Congress of Documents Concerning the
Uruguay Round Agreement, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), Dec. 22, 1993, at 2154 [hereinafter President's Uruguay Round Submission] (stating that the President's principal
negotiating objectives during the Uruguay Round were the promotion of "more open,
equitable and reciprocal market access" and the reduction or elimination of all barriers
to trade and other trade distorting practices while at the same time preserving the
sovereign ability of the United States to enforce its laws against inequitable trade
practices).
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offers recommendations for President Clinton to consider before he proceeds down a precarious reclassification path. The underlying premise of
this Comment is that the multi-purpose reclassification issue has been
adequately addressed by the Court of International Trade8 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit9 and any further
efforts to reclassify multi-purpose vehicles may be illegal under the
GATT and actionable under the GATT's dispute resolution procedures.
Furthermore, in light of the recent conclusion of the Uruguay Round
negotiations, President Clinton's reclassification options will be limited
further if Japan decides to invoke the GATT dispute resolution mechanism because the United States will soon lose its ability to utilize its
single country veto power to prevent the adoption of GAIT panel reports.'

0

I. BACKGROUND: ORIGINS OF THE MINIVAN DISPUTE
A. THE "CHICKEN TAX" TARIFF
The ongoing dispute between the United States and Japan over the

8. See Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 1521 (CL Int'l
Trade 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 530 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (overruling the Customs Service's
and Treasury Department's classification of two-door multi-purpose vehicles as vehicles for the transportation of goods rather than persons and thus dutiable at a dramatically higher 25% ad valorem rate).
9. Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding
that the Court of International Trade had "properly classified" the two-door Nissan
Pathfinder "as vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons" under the
Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States).
10. See President's Uruguay Round Submission, supra note 7, at 2163 (asserting
that the new dispute settlement process significantly improves the dispute resolution
process because disputing states must now accept panel reports unless a consensus
develops to reject the panel report). In addition, the Dispute Settlement Understanding
requires strict time limits for countries to bring their existing laws into conformity
with GATr panel recommendations or rulings. Id. Disputing parties can complete the
overall dispute settlement process within a sixteen month period. Id. Under the new
GATTl agreement, a decision by the United States to ignore a GATT panel report
will not only leave the United States in violation of its international obligations but
could lead to retaliation by the moving party. Id.at 2163-64; see also Richard H.
Steinberg, The Uruguay Round. A Legal Analysis of the Final Act, at 63-64 (1994)
(discussing the implementation of stronger dispute settlement resolution procedures at
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round including- integrated dispute settlement procedures, the potential for cross-retaliation as a result of a favorable panel determination,
more timely review for hearing and resolving disputes, and automatic adoption procedures for GATF panel reports unless a consensus develops against their adoption).
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reclassification of minivans and sport utility vehicles has its origins in
one of the most unlikely products." In 1963, the Federal Republic of
Germany announced that its domestic poultry industry needed protection
from imported poultry, primarily from the United States, and tripled
tariffs on imported poultry. 2
In the Fall of 1963, the Johnson Administration retaliated by raising
the tariff on imported trucks, brandy, dextrine, and potato starch to
25%. 13 The original purpose of this tariff was to retaliate against the
German government for increasing the duty on frozen chickens by making it more costly to sell trucks in the United States, thereby reducing
German truck exports to the United States. 4 Although the United
States government repealed the tariff on such items as brandy and potato
starch, the 25% duty on trucks remains in force to this day."5 Even
though the United States achieved its objectives, 16 the American consumer and the German truck industry have incurred an economic cost.
This "chicken tax" led Volkswagen to discontinue sales of its pickup
truck line in the United States, thereby eliminating a large segment of
imported German trucks from the United States market."7
11. Sands, supra note 2, at Cl.
12. Id.
13. Proclamation No. 3564, 3 C.F.R. 318 (1959-63). Paragraph (2) of this proclamation amended the Tariff Schedules of the United States by inserting the following:
Rate of Duty
Item
Article
945. 13
Potato starch (provided for in item
2.5 cents per lb.
132.50 ...........
945. 16 Brandy, valued over $9.00 per gallon
(provided for in items 168.20 and
$5 per gal.
168.22 ...........
945. 49
Dextrine and soluble or chemically
treated starches (provided for in
3 cents per lb.
item 493.30 ......
945. 69 Automobile trucks valued at $1,000
or more (provided for in item
25% ad val.
692.05 ...........
Id. at 319.
14. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 649, 652 n.1
(CL Int'l Trade 1984), affd, 753 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
15. See Sands, supra note 2, at Cl (stating that the 25% "chicken tax" tariff on
light trucks continues to remain in force and now applies to certain Japanese vehicles,
such as minivans, imported into the United States).
16. Japan Automobile Manufacturer's Association, MPV Tariff Reclassification
Issue Paper, Dec. 28, 1992, at 1.
17. Gwenell Bass, Multipurpose Vehicles--Are they Cars or Trucks?, CONGRES-
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In 1980, the United States "applied" the "chicken tax" tariff to imported Japanese trucks and cab chassis, which then became subject to a
25% tariff rate. 8 In 1984, the Japanese automobile industry challenged
the United States classification of lightweight trucks and cab chassis as
finished trucks because the new classification significantly increased the
tariffs on Japanese imported lightweight trucks and cab chassis.' The
Court of International Trade upheld the cab chassis classification and the
25% tariff and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
decision.' Once again, the cost to consumers was dramatic: over the
next three years, this tariff led to more than a 23% increase in imported
truck prices while the price of American-made compact trucks increased
by 29%." Ironically, the Japanese auto industry remains the principal
target of this tariff despite the chicken tariff's rather limited purpose and
even though Japan imports more United States poultry products than any
other countryY
B.

HISTORY OF MINIVAN RECLASSIFICATION

In January of 1989, the United States Customs Service (Customs
Service) reclassified imported minivans and sport utility vehicles from
"passenger vehicles," which carry a 2.5% tariff, to "trucks," which carry
a 25% tariff.' The Customs Service based its decision to reclassify
minivans and sport utility vehicles at the 25% rate on its belief that
multi-purpose vehicles such as minivans and sport utility vehicles are
designed principally as trucks and not as passenger vehicles" This deSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, June 18, 1993, at 2, 3.
18. Porter & Novelli, Issue Brief - MPV ReclassificationlTariffIssue, June 1993,
at 1 (on file with author).
19. Toyota Motor Sales, 585 F. Supp. at 649, 651.

20. See id.at 663 (upholding the United States government's classification of
Toyota's cab chassis as a truck).
21. Porter & Novelli, supra note 18, at 1 (on file with author).
22. Sands, supra note 2, at Cl.
23. Letter from John Durant, Director, United States Customs Service Commercial
Ruling Division, to John B. Rehm, Attorney, Dorsey & Whitney (Jan. 4, 1989) [here-

inafter Durant Letter] (on file with the United States Customs Service Office of Regulations and Rulings).
24. Dale E. Kildee & Bud Shuster, Stop Word Games; A Truck is a Truck, USA
TODAY, Mar. 23, 1993, at 13A. Multi-purpose vehicles are "built directly from a

truck chassis," they are frequently assembled on the same line as other light trucks,
they contain truck engines and suspensions, several government agencies classify multi-purpose vehicles as trucks and not as passenger vehicles for purposes of complying
with United States fuel economy and emission standards, and "all multi-purpose vehi-
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cision to reclassify multi-purpose vehicles from passenger vehicles to
trucks removed what many observers in the domestic automobile industry believed to be an unfair advantage to the Japanese automobile industry.' Automotive industry analysts have estimated that this ruling could
provide hundreds of millions of dollars in additional tariff revenue to
the United States Treasury.'6
During 1989, however, Treasury Department Secretary Nicholas
Brady, under "enormous pressure" from the domestic and international
automobile industry, reversed the Customs Service's reclassification
decision." The Treasury Department based its determination primarily
on the fact that all sport utility vehicles with four doors and rear seats
should be classified as cars because they are designed to transport people rather than goods.' Recently, President Clinton has criticized the

cle manufacturers report sales of these vehicles as trucks" and not as passenger vehicles. Id. When reporting its volume of exports to the United States, the Japanese government counts multi-purpose vehicles as trucks and not as passenger vehicles. Id.
25. See Memorandum from the American Automobile Manufacturers Association
on the Consistent Application of Regulations and Standards to Multi-Purpose Vehicles
(June 1993) (on file with author) (arguing for the consistent and fair application of
United States laws and regulations with strong consideration for the national interest).
The United States automobile industry asserts that foreign lobbyists are manipulating
United States tariff schedules to enable the importation of sport utility vehicles and
minivans at one tenth the tariff rate. Id.; see also Kildee & Shuster, supra note 24,
at 13A (asserting that the Customs Service's classification of multi-purpose vehicles as
passenger vehicles at the 2.5% tariff rate rather than as trucks at the 25% has created
an unfair loophole that has allowed Japanese manufacturers to avoid the payment of
over one billion dollars in duties).
26.

Bass, supra note 17, at 4; see Geoff Sundstrom, Vans, Utilities Socked With

a 25% Tariff, AuToMoTivE NEWS, Jan. 9, 1989, at 1 (stating that industry statistics
reveal that the Customs Service's reclassification ruling would cover approximately
250,000 vehicles annually, translating into hundreds of millions of dollars in tariff
revenue).
27. Kildee & Shuster, supra note 24, at 13A; see Naftali Bendavid, Marubeni
America Corp. v. United States, LEGAL TIMES, May 24, 1993, at 17 (reporting pressure by the domestic automobile industry on the United States Treasury Department to
reverse the reclassification decision); see generally Paul Magnussan, Look Who's Lobbying for Japan Inc., BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 8, 1990, at 14 (discussing the revolving
door for former government officials who lobby on behalf of foreign businesses and
Japan's great success at utilizing American lobbyists to achieve their objectives).
28. Warren Brown, Where There's a Wheel, There's a Way to Define; A Lot
Rides on How Vehicles Are Classed, WASH. POST, May 19, 1993, at Fl. The Trea-

sury Department did uphold, however, the Customs Service's ruling classifying the
two door sport utility vehicles as trucks and therefore subject to a 25% tariff. Id. The
Court of International Trade in Marubeni America Corp. v. United States, 821 F.
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Treasury Department's 1989 reversal of the Customs Service reclassification decision, setting the stage for a possible showdown between the
Clinton Administration,' the United States automobile industry, and the
Japanese automobile industry over the proper classification method for
multi-purpose vehicles and sport utility vehicles.'
C. HISTORY OF MINIVAN DUMPING

While dumping has existed in international trade for over four hundred years, governments have only recently restricted its practice.' In
the United States, a dumping investigation begins when the government
receives a petition from a domestic industry alleging that imports are
being sold at unfair prices in the United States."
In May 1991, General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and
Chrysler Corporation filed an anti-dumping petition with the Department
of Commerce and the ITC, alleging that imported Japanese minivans
injured the United States automobile industry. 3 This petition marked

Supp. 1521 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993), overruled the Treasury Department's ruling on
two-door sport utility vehicles.
29. See Sands, supra note 2, at C1 (noting President Clinton's statement calling
for the reclassification of multi-purpose vehicles in order to eliminate a S300 million
a year windfall to the Japanese); see also Rechtin, supra note 4. at 37 (reporting
President Clinton's statement that the 1989 Treasury Department reclassification decision was a "$300 million freebie" to the Japanese automobile industry); cf. Gates,
supra note 5, at 1 (noting that the 1,000% tariff differential amounts to a $500 million a year gift to the Japanese).
30. Sands, supra note 2, at C1.

31. 3 JOSEPH E.

PATrSON, ANTIDUAhING AND COUNTERVAIIING

DuTY

LAWS

§

1.02[1] (1994). Dumping is a form of price discrimination and is defined as the practice of "selling a commodity from one country to a different country under similar
conditions of sale for less than its price in its own country." Id. A commodity's "fair
market value" is generally considered to be "the price of the commodity in the country in which it is produced." Id. at n.2.
32. J. Michael Finger & Tracy Murray, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Enforcement in the United States 242 in ANTDU PING: How IT WVORKS AND WHO
GErs HURT (J. Michael Finger ed., 1993). The International Trade Commission and
the Commerce Department both receive the petition and must determine within twenty
days whether the allegation is reasonably supported by available information. Id. The
International Trade Commission then has 45 days to determine whether there is sufficient evidence that a United States industry has been materially injured or threatened
with material injury. Id.A negative determination made by the International Trade
Commission will end the case. Id.
33. See General Motors Corp. v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 774. 778 (C. Int'l
Trade 1993) (asserting that the American minivan market has been injured or will
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the first anti-dumping action brought by the United States automobile
makers against the Japanese automobile industry. 4 On July 15, 1991,
the ITC notified the Department of Commerce that sufficient evidence
existed to warrant a further investigation into the allegation of material
injury to the United States minivan industry.35 On January 2, 1992, the
Department of Commerce issued a preliminary determination, finding
that Japanese minivans manufactured by Toyota Motor Corporation and
Mazda Motor Corporation were sold in the United States at less than
fair value.36 On May 26, 1992, the Department of Commerce issued its
final determination that Toyota and Mazda sold minivans in the United
States at less than fair value.37
As a result of the Department of Commerce's affirmative determination, the ITC began its final investigation. On June 24, 1992, the ITC

face injury if Japanese minivans are sold below their actual cost of production or fair
market value).
34. Stuart Auerbach & Warren Brown, Japan 'Dumping' Minivans, U.S. Rules,
WASH. POST, May 20, 1992, at Al. American companies have filed a number of
dumping complaints against foreign manufacturers in other highly competitive areas
such as semiconductors, steel, chemicals and cement. Id.; see Big Three U.S.
Automakers File Petition Against Japanese Manufacturers of Minivans, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA), June 5, 1991, at xxx (noting the "unprecedented move" by the Big
Three in filing this dumping petition).
35. New Minivans From Japan, 57 Fed. Reg. 43 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (prelim.
LTFV determination) [hereinafter Preliminary Determination].
36. Id.; see 19 C.F.R. § 353.42 (1994) (discussing the relationship between "fair
value" and "foreign market value"); see also 19 C.F.R. § 353.46(a)(1) (1994) (defining "foreign market value" as "the price at which such or similar merchandise is sold
or offered for sale in the principal markets of the home market country, in the usual
commercial quantities and in the ordinary course of trade for home consumption").
Put simply, when the United States price for the merchandise is less than the
importer's foreign market value, there is a sale at less than fair value. This underpricing tactic can also be used by a company to gain a greater share of a foreign market
while using its domestic market or even a third market to make up the difference in
lost revenues.
37. New Minivans From Japan, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,937 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (final
LTFV determination) [hereinafter Final Determination]. Of particular importance in
reaching its affirmative dumping decision, the Department of Commerce took the
uncommon practice of examining the "keiretsu system" or the close relationship between the automaker and its suppliers. Id. at 21,949. Accordingly, the Department of
Commerce investigators found a "systematic pattern of lower prices for parts going
into export models compared to the prices charged for parts in vehicles which are to
be sold in Japan." Auerbach & Brown, supra note 34, at Al. This practice enabled
the Japanese automobile manufacturers to sell their minivans at "below their fair value
in the United States." Id.
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reached a negative determination pursuant to section 735(b) of the Tariff
Act of 1930 8 and found that the United States automobile industry was
not materially injured by imports of Japanese minivans." On July 12,
1993, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler unsuccessfully appealed the
ITC's negative determination to the United States Court of International
Trade.' Part ImI of this Comment addresses the determinations of the
Commerce Department and the ITC in greater detail.
II. THE MULTI-PURPOSE VEHICLE, SPORT UTILITY
VEHICLE, AND MINIVAN RECLASSIFICATION ISSUE
A.

THE CUSTOMS SERVICE'S DETERMINATION

On November 21, 1988, Suzuki Motor Corporation requested a Customs Service determination whether certain Suzuki vehicles, principally
the Suzuki Samurai, are considered "motor vehicles for the transport of
goods" within the meaning of heading 8704 of the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) or "motor vehicles principally
designed for the transport of persons" under HTSUS heading 8703."'
There are two relevant HTSUS headings for motor vehicles: HTSUS
heading 8703, which primarily addresses vehicles for the transport of
persons, and HTSUS heading 8704, which covers non-passenger or
goods carrying vehicles.4 The classification of these vehicles was important because if multi-purpose vehicles, such as the Suzuki Samurai,

38. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (1988).
39. Minivans From Japan, USITC Pub. 2529, Inv. No. 731-TA-522 (final determination) (July 1992), at 1.
40. General Motors, 827 F. Supp. at 774, 788 (affirming the ITC's negative

determination of material injury primarily because the elements of material injury were
not compelling enough to warrant a finding of material injury and were insufficient to
overturn the rather considerable evidence on which the ITC relied).
41. Durant Letter, supra note 23. Counsel for Suzuki requested that the Samurai
be classified as a "motor vehicle for the transport of goods" under HTSUS heading
8704 if it was imported without rear seats or other accessories in its rear area. Id.at
3. If, however, the Samurai was imported with rear seats and other options in the
rear seat area that impede the loading, transport or unloading of goods, it should be
classified under HTSUS heading 8703 as a "motor vehiclel principally designed for
the transport of persons." Id. at 4.
42. Id.at 4. The General Rules of nterpretation control HTSUS tariff classification. ld. HTSUS heading 8703 was designed to address "[miotor cars and other motor
vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons . . . " while HTSUS heading 8704 was constructed to address "[mlotor vehicles for the transport of
goods .. . " Id.
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were classified as trucks under HTSUS heading 8704, then they would
not be considered part of the import quotas under the terms of the
United States - Japanese Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRA), negotiated during the 1980s.1 3 Consequently, Japanese automobile manufacturers are free to remove these vehicles from their import passenger car
quotas and increase their overall number of vehicle exports to the United States without altering their established ratios for automobiles under
the VRA." According to the Customs Service's interpretation of the
rules, a vehicle that is designed both for the transport of persons and
goods is not subject to classification under heading 8703 because it fails
the "principally designed for the transport of persons" requirement under
HTSUS heading 8703."5

43. Customs classifies import utility vehicles as trucks; Resists pressure from
D.C., AUToWEEK, Apr. 11, 1988, at 9.
44. Car-truck border dispute; Customs reclassifies multi-purpose vehicles,
AUTOWEEK, Jin. 16, 1989, at 5.
45. Durant Letter, supra note 23, at 4. The Customs Service determined that
Suzuki 4 by 4 vehicles are designed on a truck chassis, capable of off-road use, and
have a body style designed for the transport of goods. Id. at 4-5. To support this position, the Customs Service offered several important factors such as: a body style
that allows for "easy loading, transportation and unloading of goods," a swinging rear
door, a flat floor, a rear loading deck, and a high roof. Id. at 5. The primary rationale for the Customs Service's ruling was the Samurai's "readily accessible and usable cargo space" and "chassis and suspension that permits a cargo payload which is
approximately 20% of the gross vehicle weight rating." Id. The usual percentage of
payload for small pickup trucks is 15% to 25% of gross vehicle weight. Id. Consequently, the Customs Service found that the Suzuki Samurai should be classified as a
"truck" under heading 8704. Id.
The Customs Service also stated that the vehicle's design and accessories
"create a presumption that the vehicle has been principally designed for an intended
purpose"--the transport of goods under HTSUS heading 8704. Id. at 5. Secondary
design features, however, which allow for other vehicle uses should be used only as
evidence that the vehicle is a multi-purpose vehicle. Id. As long as the change or
design feature does not "significantly alter" the vehicle's basic design, a vehicle such
as the Suzuki Samurai or such similar vehicle remains equally designed for the
transport of goods and persons. Id. If the vehicle fails the "principally designed for
the transport of persons" test under HTSUS heading 8703, it must remain classified
as a truck subject to a 25% duty. Id. at 6. While the Customs Service recognized
that a significant alteration in the body style could require a different ruling, it explicitly stated that including such items as carpeting, removable or folding rear seats,
and interior trim packages, does not appreciably affect the vehicle's primary design as
a vehicle which transports goods and not people. Id. at 5. According to the Customs
Service, an example of a "material change" in body style is one that limits cargo
loading and unloading. Id.
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Furthermore, according to the Customs Service, a multi-purpose or
dual-purpose vehicle should not be considered a passenger vehicle simply because it has both front and rear seating.' Based upon this analysis, the Customs Service concluded that the Samurai will be classified
under HTSUS heading 8704 as a non-passenger vehicle and therefore
"dutiable at twenty five percent ad valorem."
B. THE TREASURY DEPARTMErT'S DETERMINATION
On March 1, 1989, the Treasury Department issued a clarification of
the Customs Service's January 4, 1989 ruling.' While it affirmed the
Customs Service's conclusion, the Treasury Department stated that the
ruling and the criteria issued to Customs Service officers were inconsistent with the interpretation of the applicable HTSUS headings.' The
Treasury Department clarified the Customs Service's criteria given to its
field offices and then analyzed the interpretation of the phrase "including station wagons" under HTSUS heading 8703.-' After examining the

46. Durant Letter, supra note 23, at 5 (discussing that station wagons are not
dual purpose vehicles because they were designed primarily for transporting persons
and secondarily for transporting goods).
47. Id. at 6. The principal factors for this classification under HTSUS heading
8704 included the chassis and suspension, body style, payload capacity, a 26 1/2 inch
seating reference point, and the degree to which rear seating affects cargo capacity.
Id Of particular importance to Customs was the Samurai's basic design which was
suitable both to the transport of persons and goods, and that the design for the transport of goods appeared "at least equal to" the design for the transport of passengers.
Id As a result, the Customs Service could classify the Samurai under HTSUS heading 8703 because it fails to satisfy the "'principally designed' for the transport of
persons" requirement. Id.at 4.
48. Memorandum from M. Peter McPherson, Deputy Secretary of Treasury, and
Salvatore R. Martoche, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Enforcement, to William
Von Raab, Commissioner of Customs, (Mar. 1, 1989) [hereinafter McPherson &
Martoche Memorandum] (on file with the United States Customs Service Office of
Regulations and Rulings).
49. Ld.at 1.
50. Id. at 2-3. This process was important because, in theory, any of these dualpurpose vehicles--including multi-purpose vehicles and sport utility vehicles could be
classified as falling within the meaning of the term "including station wagons." Id. at
2. The Customs Service offered a number of interpretations: 1) reading the phrase
"including station wagons" to mean an exception to the "principally designed" ruleincluding vehicles in the same class as station wagons even if they are not chiefly
designed to carry people; 2) interpreting the phrase to mean that station wagons are
not precluded from an 8703 classification simply because they are capable of carrying
cargo; 3) reading the language to establish that dual purpose vehicles are "deemed to
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explanatory notes as well as the purpose of the Act, the Treasury Department concluded that the correct reading of the "including station
wagons" language should not be rigidly applied as an exception to, or
an expansion of, the requirement that all products are classifiable under
HTSUS heading 8703 if they are primarily designed for the transport of
people.5 In other words, multi-purpose vehicles and sport utility vehicles are not precluded from classification under HTSUS heading 8703 as
"motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons" simply
because their overall design allows them to carry both cargo and transport people.52
The Treasury Department then analyzed the criteria for the classification of sport utility vehicles and focused on the distinction between two
types of design features: structural design features and auxiliary design
features.53 The Treasury Department cautioned that neither structural design features nor auxiliary design features should be used exclusively to
ascertain the vehicle's primarily design purpose.54 The Treasury Department did identify, however, one important characteristic: rear side doors
with windows, as convincing evidence that passenger transport, rather
than cargo transport, was a primary design criterion for certain classes
of multi-purpose vehicles.55 Consequently, the Treasury Department
concluded that four-door sport utility vehicles with rear side doors and
rear windows should be classified as motor vehicles "principally designed for the transport of persons" under HTSUS heading 8703.56
The Treasury Department did not extend the same treatment to twodoor sport utility vehicles, finding that because two-door sport utility
vehicles do not come with the a rear door and window design and be-

be members of the class of vehicles that are principally designed for the transport of
persons;" 4) interpreting the word "including" when followed by specific examples to
restrict its application only to those examples actually listed. Id. at 2-3.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. at 7.
53. Id. at 7. Structural design features include "body, chassis, and suspension
design" and are considered important because they have an impact on rear seating
access. Id. Auxiliary design features include seating as well as other vehicle options.
Id.
54. Id. at 8. While this analysis also applies to vehicles with integral design
characteristics designed for the transport of cargo, neither of these characteristics
should be exclusively relied upon to make a classification under either HTSUS heading 8703 or 8704. Id.
55. Id. at 8. This type of body design is also seen commonly in many four-door

sedans and station wagons. Id.
56.

Id. at 9.
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cause they are primarily built from truck designs, two-door sport utility
vehicles do not have the same structural design features as four-door
sport utility vehicleOs Essentially, the Treasury Department made a
distinction between two- and four-door vehicles primarily on the basis of
the vehicle's
number of doors and the permanence of its rear seating
58
capability.
In addressing minivans, the Treasury Department stated the importance
of both integral and auxiliary design features in determining whether a
minivan is principally designed to carry cargo or persons. 9 Since the
minivan's integral design features can be used for both cargo and passenger-carrying, auxiliary design features are critical in determining a
minivan's tariff classification.' In conclusion, the Treasury Department
cited three auxiliary design features which are determinative in the tariff

57. Id. at 9. While two-door sport utility vehicles have passenger compatible
auxiliary design features such as a rear seat seating area, the Treasury Department
concluded that foldable or removable rear seating is not a structural feature that significantly "alters the purpose for which the vehicle [was] principally designed." Id. In
fact, either removable or foldable seats coupled with a flat rear space enables one to
use the vehicle's interior for cargo carrying purposes. Id. Without a major cargo cartying alteration to the vehicle, the Treasury Department declined to frind that removable or folding rear seats and other "rear-area passenger amenities" demonstrated
conclusively that the vehicle was principally designed to transport persons; therefore,
two-door sport utility vehicles with these features should be classified under HTSUS
heading 8704 as vehicles "principally designed for the transport of goods" and thus
subject to a much larger 25% tariff rate. Id.
58. d at 9; see infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text (reviewing the appeal
of the Treasury Department's conclusion regarding two-door sport utility vehicles in
the Court of International Trade's Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States decision); see
also supra note 45 (discussing the differences between two-door and four-door multipurpose vehicles for tariff classification purposes).
59. McPherson & Martoche Memorandum, supra note 48, at 10-12. The Treasury
Department dismissed the seating reference point as immaterial for tariff classification
purposes. Id. at 10-11. The seating reference point is the measurement or relationship
between the seat's placement and the comparative difficulty or ease with which the
passenger accesses it. Id at 11. The Treasury Department also stated that while the
presence of a sliding door on a van with back seats could be construed to indicate a
non-passenger based design, this feature not only aids in the unloading of cargo, it
also allows rear passengers to enter and exit the vehicle more easily. Id. at 11. In
fact, the Treasury Department found the placement of windows on the vehicle's side
panels and rear side door "consistent with the intention to design a passenger vehicle"
is insufficient alone to warrant a classification under heading 8703 of the HTSUS. Id.
at 11-12. Failure to place windows in these areas is, however, a significant indicator
that the vehicle is not primarily designed to transport persons. Id. at 12.
60. Id.
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classification of a minivan.6
C.

THE CUSTOMS SERVICE'S NEW CLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

Pursuant to the May 4, 1989 Treasury Department guidelines, the
Customs Service revoked its January 4, 1989 decision and issued a new
set of instructions for the classification of multi-purpose vehicles.62
Most significantly, the Customs Service abandoned its articulation of a
presumption that a vehicle is principally designed for an intended purpose once its basic design and features are established.6 The Customs
Service also removed from its instructions the position that a design
equally suited for the transport of goods and persons precludes a
vehicle's classification under HTSUS heading 8703.' The new ruling
eliminated the language that a multi-purpose or dual purpose vehicle is
not "principally designed for the transport of persons" solely because of
its front and rear seating capacity.65 Instead, the new ruling focused
almost exclusively on the vehicle's structural design features rather than
on its auxiliary design features or options.' In reaching this decision,

61. Id. The Treasury Department offered the following conclusion with regard to
the meaningful role auxiliary design features play in the minivan's tariff classification:
When a rear side passenger-access door, windows on the rear side passenger
access door and on the side panels of [sic] both sides of the vehicle, and rear
seating for two or more persons (3] are all provided, the vehicle is principally

designed for the transport of persons, even though it also has the capability of
carrying a significant volume of cargo. The appropriate classification is therefore
under heading 8703, HTSUS.
Id.

62. Letter from John Durant, Director, United States Customs Service Commercial
Rulings Division, to John B. Rehm, Dorsey & Whitney (May 4, 1989) (on file with
the United States Customs Service Office of Regulations and Rulings).
63. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the Customs Service's
conclusion that a vehicle's basic design and features "create a presumption that the
vehicle has been principally designed for an intended purpose"--the transport of goods
under HTSUS heading 8704).
64. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (stating that the Samurai's
basic design is suitable both for the transport of persons and goods and that its overall design for transporting goods appears at least equal to the design for transporting
passengers).
65. See McPherson & Martoche Memorandum, supra note 48, at 9 (stating that
front and rear seating on a multi-purpose or dual-purpose vehicle are not sufficient by
themselves for a vehicle to be considered "principally designed for the transport of
persons").
66. Id. at 5. In fact, in its revised determination, the Customs Service now stated
that auxiliary features such as seating and trim packages "are not a significant alter-
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the Customs Service apparently decided that basing its analysis on structural design rather than auxiliary features was a more sound and convincing legal proposition.
In a subsequent May 4, 1989 memorandum to its Regional Commissioners, District Directors, Area Directors, and Port Directors, the Commissioner of Customs issued instructions regarding the classification of
multi-purpose vehicles and small vans.' While the conclusion is the
same as the January 4, 1989 ruling, the rationale is somewhat different.
Of particular importance is the greater attention paid to the differentiation between two-door and four-door sport utility vehicles.' s While reaffirming the distinction between a body structure that facilitates the
transportation of cargo over persons, the instructions promulgated explicitly drew a distinction between two-door and four-door models.

ation to the goods-carrying structure so as to require a conclusion that they are principally designed for the transport of persons." Id.
67. Memorandum from William Von Raab, Commissioner of Customs, United
States Customs Service, to all Regional Commissioners, District Directors, Area Directors, and Port Directors, United States Customs Service (May 4, 1989) [hereinafter
Von Raab Memorandum] (on file with the United States Customs Service Office of
Regulations and Rulings).
68. Id. at 1-2.
69. Id. The Commissioner of Customs issued the following instructions:
(i)Sport-Utility Vehicles are designed to perform multiple functions. They typically have a body and chassis design stronger than that of ordinary passenger
cars. They also have a boxy body structure . . . which facilitate the loading

and unloading of cargo. These features suit the vehicles for the transportation
of goods.
(ii) However, some sport utility vehicles have structural modifications that are
evidence of a design in which transportation of persons is to be a primary
purpose. For this reason a distinction is made for classification purposes between two-door and four-door models. On four-door models the rear doors are
typically hinged and do not fully open . . . [which] is a strong indication that

passenger transport, rather than cargo transport, was a principal design criterion
for the vehicle.
(iii)
Therefore, four-door sport-utility vehicles having the features described
above generally will be classified [under] . . . heading 8703, when imported

with hinged rear side doors and equipped with windows.
(iv) It is also typical for two-door sport-utility vehicles to have the features described in paragraph A(i). However, unlike four-door vehicles, the two door
vehicles do not have other structural features that evidence transportation of
persons as a design priority. Therefore, . . . they generally will be classified
[under] . . . heading 8704, even when imported with folding or removable rear
seats.

Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
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The new instructions are quite favorable toward four-door sport utility
vehicles and less favorable to the two-door models. The Customs Service probably intended to prevent importers from merely adding removable or foldable rear seating in order to enter the United States under
HTSUS heading 8703, dutiable at 2.5%, rather than under HTSUS heading 8704, dutiable at 25%7o In fact, the Commissioner gave specific
instructions that two-door sport utility vehicles, like the Nissan Pathfimder, should enter the United States as trucks under HTSUS heading 8704
despite their importation with rear seats.7
Finally, pursuant to the March 4, 1989 Treasury Department memorandum, the Commissioner of Customs issued written instructions to his
Regional Commissioners, District Directors, Area Directors, and Port
Directors regarding minivan classification.7" The Commissioner set forth
certain features which, if met, would allow minivans to be classified as
passenger vehicles under HTSUS heading 8703 and therefore subject
only to one-tenth the tariff rate.73

D.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

An appeal was taken before the Court of International Trade.74 As
previously discussed, the principal issue was whether 1989 and 1990
model year two-door Nissan Pathfinders should be classified as "motor
vehicles for the transport of goods" under HTSUS heading 8704 or as
"motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons" under
HTSUS heading 8703.' 5 After a detailed examination of all the issues,
70. Id. at 2-3.
71. Id. at 3; see infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text (reviewing the successful appeal of the Treasury Department's classification of two-door sport utility
vehicles as trucks dutiable at a 25% tariff rate under HTSUS heading 8704 before the
Court of International Trade in Marubeni America Corp. v. United States).

72. Von Raab Memorandum, supra note 67, at 2-3.
73. Id. The Commissioner's instructions stated:
(i) Vans will be classified in heading 8703 when imported with all of the
following features:
(1) Windows in the rear side panels
(2) Rear seating for two or more persons
(3) Three or more side doors, one of which offers access to the rear of the

compartment
(ii) Vans imported without all three of these features will be classified under
heading 8704 [as motor vehicles for the transport of goods].
Id.
74. Marubeni America Corp. v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 1521 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1993).
75. Id. at 1522. The vehicle in question, the Nissan Pathfinder, is a two-door
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the court reversed the Customs Service's 1989 classification of two-door
sport-utility vehicles primarily because it was convinced that the
Pathfinder's overall structural and non-structural design characteristics
and its available features more closely resembled a car's design rather
than a truck's design.76
The court openly acknowledged the government's difficult task of
justifying the Pathfinder's classification under HTSUS heading 8704.
First, the government tried to convince the court that the Pathfinder fits
the common industry meaning of a truck rather than a passenger vehicle78 and also attempted to demonstrate the similarities between the
Pathfinder and the Nissan Hardbody pick-up truck?' The court found
that while these vehicles have certain structural components in common,
the Pathfinder's major design modifications significantly differentiated it
from the Hardbody's pick-up truck design.' °
The court cited passenger ride and the overall body design as the
most significant differences and noted that in designing the Pathfinder,
Nissan engineers went to great lengths and expense to improve the
passenger ride.8 The court also endeavored to understand the difference
multi-purpose passenger vehicle and also is identified as a sport utility vehicle. Id.
While it is built on the same frame as the Nissan Hardbody compact pick-up truck,
the Pathfinder does not have a cargo box (i.e., a rear cargo bed) which is the distinguishable mark of a pick-up truck. Id.
76. Id. at 1529.
77. Id. at 1523. In fact, Judge Restani explained from the outset of the case that
"[tlhe sample [Nissan Pathfinder] virtually shouts to the consumer, 'I am a car, not a
truck."' Id.
78. Id. at 1523-24.
79. Marubeni Am. Corp., 821 F. Supp. at 1524-25. The Hardbody is Nissan Motor Corporation's compact pick-up truck, which is classified under HTSUS heading
8704 as a motor vehicle for the transport of goods. Id. at 1524. While the Hardbody
has certain features in the passenger compartment which contribute to the feeling of a
passenger car, "it is accepted as a 'truck' by the foreign and domestic automobile
industry largely because it has an "open [rear] cargo box that is characteristic of a
pick-up truck." Id.
80. Id. at 1524-26. Nissan built the Pathfinder for the purpose of securing some
of the fast emerging market for compact multi-purpose vehicles, which can carry both
passengers and cargo. Id. at 1524. With this in mind, the Nissan's principal design
engineer testified that primarily for economic reasons, Nissan wanted to borrow as
much as possible from the Hardbody design. Id. For example, Nissan engineers used
the Hardbody's costly frame side rails on the Pathfitder. Id. There were, however, a
number of differences including a shorter rear bumper, a different framelbumper configuration, a new spare tire and gas tank position, and a larger standard engine. Id. at
1524-25.
81. Id. at 1525 (discussing the development of an altogether new rear suspension
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in suspension by test driving the two vehicles." Most importantly, the
court found that the Pathfinder's station wagon-like body allows for

sufficient back seat space capable of carrying average sized passengers
with a surprising amount of comfort.83 The Pathfinder's ability to
transport comfortably adult sized passengers in its rear seating area
without any modification was crucial to the court's overall determination
that its design more closely resembled a car than a truck.84
In its second argument, the government sought to demonstrate that the
Pathfinder's strength and weight were principally designed for off-road
cargo and not merely for general off-road use. 5 The court rejected this
argument largely because the Pathfinder had both the physical capability
and the standard car-like passenger amenities to hold adult passengers

system that was developed exclusively for the Pathfinder). According to the court, the
Pathfinder received a five link coil suspension, instead of a standard truck leaf spring
suspension, which has a different ride depending on the size of the cargo load. Id.
82. Id. During the test drive, Judge Restani found a noticeable difference in ride
between the Pathfinder and the Hardbody primarily because the Hardbody's ride was
"bumpier" and was, therefore, more "trucklike" in both ride and in road feel. Id.
83. Id.
84. Marubeni Am. Corp., 821 F. Supp. at 1525-26. In turning its attention to the
rear seat area of the Pathfinder, the court found the rear seats not only well designed,
but both "comfortable" and "reclin[able]." Id. at 1525. Equally important, the court
found that while the Pathfinder's rear seats fold down to form a flat cargo area, they
are not removable. Id. at 1526. While this analysis appears to contradict the Treasury
Department's recently issued memorandum regarding the significance of design criteria
for sport utility vehicle classification, the court relied on already mentioned structural
design features as well as other auxiliary design features such as arm rests, ashtrays,
handholds, operable windows, footwells, rear seat stereo outlets, seat belts, and child
seat tie down hooks as evidence of the significant differences between the Pathfinder
and the Hardbody's rear seating and cargo areas. Id. at 1525-26. Moreover, the court
explained that while the Pathfinder and the Hardbody do share a number of structural
features, they were designed independently, and they were "based on totally different
concepts." Id. at 1526. The court also found a notable price difference between the
Hardbody and the Pathfinder and also found a significant reduction in cargo capacity,
with the Pathfinder's cargo capacity more comparable to a midsize station wagon due
to its rear seat configuration. Id.
85. Id. at 1527. The government contended that because of its lack of rear seat
head room, the "strength and weight of the Pathfinder must be for off-road hauling of
cargo, not people." Id. To support this argument, the government asserted that because
of its shorter rear seat head room, an above-average sized person would have a difficult time keeping his head from bumping into the top of the Pathfinder's roof when
driving over considerable off road terrain. Id. According to the government, this lack
of rear seat comfort during off-road use should be regarded as evidence of a vehicle
design meant primarily for cargo rather than passenger transport. Id.
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comfortably in the rear seating area.' Furthermore, the government
cited evidence of the Pathfinder's "low off-road usage" and sought to
prove that the Pathfinder's "passenger amenities" were similar to those
offered by several other compact pick-up trucks in the marketplace.'
The court ultimately dismissed these arguments because while such evidence may be probative of the emerging similarities between compact
pick-up trucks and passenger vehicles, it failed to see how low off-road
usage and similar amenities with other brand name pick-up trucks had
any bearing whatsoever on the actual classification of the Pathfinder . '
Finally, the court addressed the government's most compelling argument, that Nissan's corporate documents and advertising materials actually refer to the Pathfinder as both a "truck" and a "car."' While recognizing that some sport utility vehicles have truck-like frames, are often
assembled in truck divisions, and are often included with trucks in advertising, the court found that industry terminology and regulatory
schemes that are used to classify sport utility vehicles as a subcategory
of trucks are not controlling factors for tariff classification purposes'

86. ld. The court also provided other reasons why the Pathfinder's rear seat was
more suitable for hauling people than for cargo. First, the Pathfinder and other sport
utility vehicles with rear seats contain seat belts for rear passenger protection. Id. at
1527. Second, the rear seats recline, giving taller people the option to increase their
rear head room space. Id. Third, the court surmised that a taller person would probably want to sit in the front seat if the vehicle was destined to go over rough terrain.
Id.
87. Id. In response to this contention, the court referred to Maritz market studies
that indicated both "high occasional off-road usage" and "little frequent off-road use."
Id. The court concluded that it was an undisputed fact that the Pathfinder was "designed for the most stressful [off-road] use" and that it cannot be sold without this
capability regardless of whether customers wish to utilize its more rugged design
features. Id.
88. 1d. The Ford Ranger is a suitable example of a truck in the domestic marketplace which shares similar amenities and arguably superior ride characteristics with
the Pathfinder. Id.
89. Marubeni Am. Corp., 821 F. Supp. at 1527-28. The government's attempt to
show that the Pathfinder was marketed to appeal to the average truck consumer was
similarly dismissed by the court because "cargo capacity" did not appear to be a high
priority in the Pathfinder's development and marketing. Id. at 1528. The court stated
that the Pathfinder's advertising and product development was geared more toward
"family use, loading groceries and sports equipment and 'go anywhere' elan" in contrast to the truck industry's emphasis on ruggedness and masculinity. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1528-29. The court also explained that such a classification is not
governed by the fact that certain design structures are more suitable for trucks. Id. at
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Most importantly, the court concluded that there were both structural
and non-structural design changes integrated into the Pathfinder's construction that were all adopted for the express purpose of carrying passengers-not cargo.92 As a result, the court classified the Pathfinder at
one-tenth the tariff rate under HTSUS heading 8703 as a vehicle "principally designed for the transport of persons." 3
What is difficult to determine is whether the court is trying to establish a numerical standard that attempts to balance a vehicle's passengerlike design and production qualities with its similarly calculated cargolike qualities. What appears certain, however, is the decision's limiting
effect on the ability of the Clinton Administration to increase the duty
on multi-purpose vehicles from 2.5% to 25% by reclassifying them as
trucks under HTSUS heading 8704."4
E. THE APPEAL BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

The outcome of this case on appeal offers further evidence of the
difficult task the Clinton Administration will face as it attempts to reclassify two-door and four-door multi-purpose vehicles under HTSUS
heading 8704.' 5 On appeal before the Federal Circuit, the Government

1528.
92. Id. In fact, when asked about potential vehicle improvements, automotive
engineers could articulate very few vehicle modifications that would serve to improve
the Pathfinder's overall ability to comfortably accommodate passengers. Id.
93. Id. at 1529.
94. See Max Gates, Big 3 Seek Appeal of Pathfinder Ruling, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS,
July 5, 1993, at 4 (stating that the recent Court of International Trade decision was a
"major setback" both for the Big Three and the Clinton Administration in their renewed effort to reclassify two-door and four-door multi-purpose vehicles, sport utility
vehicles and minivans at the higher 25% tariff rate); see also Jim Henry & Max
Gates, Congress, imports preparefor battle over court's ruling on 25% tariff, AUToMOTIVE NEWS, May 24, 1993, at 4 (noting that the decision by the Court of International Trade to reverse the classification of the two-door Nissan Pathfinder was
viewed as "legal precedent" making it more difficult for President Clinton to reclassify these vehicles at the higher 25% rate). But see id. at 4 (reporting that the Court
of International Trade's decision may have the opposite effect because it could lead
to a renewed Congressional effort to overturn the court's decision).
95. See Jonathan M. Moses, Nissan Ruling May Hurt Effort By Big Three: Pathfinder Case Is Setback For U.S. Firms Seeking To Extend 25% Tariff, WALL ST. J.,
May 17, 1993, at A4 (stating that the Court of International Trade's reversal of the
Treasury Department's decision to place a 25% tariff on the two-door Nissan Pathfinder was a serious setback for the United States automobile industry and poses a
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attempted to demonstrate that the Court of International Trade applied
"improper and inconsistent standards" by holding that the Nissan Pathfinder is designed primarily to transport persons rather than goods under
the HTSUS.' The government argued that the correct standard in determining a vehicle's principal design purpose should be its basic construction rather than both structural and auxiliary design features relied on by the Court of International Trade'3 and by the Customs Service in its March 1, 1989 memorandum.9
In contrast to the Court of International Trade's and the Customs
Service's tariff interpretation, the government contended that the appropriate question to ask is whether the vehicle's construction "is uniquely
for passenger transportation.""ro The Court of Appeals disagreed with
the government's interpretation, calling it a "constrictive interpretation"
of the tariff's language,' and found that both structural and auxiliary
design features are necessary inreaching an accurate tariff classification
determination." With no legally binding notes to the HTSUS, the
Court of Appeals construed HTSUS heading 8703 and 8704 in accordance with "their common and popular meaning"'" and articulated its
own statutory interpretation that a "vehicle's intended purpose of transporting persons [under HTSUS heading 8703] must outweigh an intended purpose of transporting goods [under HTSUS heading 8704].' '

challenge to its effort to impose a similar tariff on four-door multi-purpose vehicles).
96. Manibeni America Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530, 533-34 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
97. Id. at 534. The government stated that a vehicle's construction includes its
"structure, body, components and layout." Id.
98. See supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text (discussing two-door multi-purpose vehicle classification and the important role of structural and auxiliary design
features in their classification).
99. Id.; see McPherson and Martoche Memorandum, supra note 48, at 7-8 (outlining the criteria to be used for the classification of sport utility vehicles); see also
supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text (discussing multi-purpose vehicle classification and the role of structural and auxiliary design features in their classification).
100. Marubeni Am. Corp., 35 F.3d at 534.
101. Id. at 534-35 (noting that there is no legislative, statutory, or administrative
authority to support the government's position that structural design features should be
exclusively used for determining a vehicle's proper tariff classification under the
HTSUS).
102. Id. at 535.
103. Id. at 534.
104. Id. at 535.
105. Marubeni Am Corp., 35 F.3d at 535.
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After examining these structural and auxiliary design features, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the Court of International Trade's reclassification of
the two-door Nissan Pathfinder, finding "substantial structural changes"
and "other design" and "auxiliary design" aspects to be strong indicators
of passenger use rather than cargo use."
Ill. THE JAPANESE MINIVAN DUMPING ISSUE: THE
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION, AND THE COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DETERMINATIONS
A. THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT PRELIMINARY AND
FINAL LEss THAN FAIR VALuE DETERMINATIONS

On July 15, 1991, in response to written notification from the Department of Commerce, the ITC issued a preliminarily determination that
there was a "reasonable indication of material injury" to the United
States minivan industry." ' On January 2, 1992, the Department of
Commerce issued a preliminary determination finding that Japanese
minivans manufactured by Toyota Motor Corporation and Mazda Motor
Corporation were sold in the United States at less than fair value.' 8
After identifying the investigation scope to include new minivans from
Japan, the Department of Commerce identified seven characteristics in
determining whether a vehicle can be classified as a minivan.'" The

106. Id. at 536-38.
107. Preliminary Determination, supra note 35.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 44. The Department of Commerce defined new minivans as:
an on-highway motor vehicle which generally has the following seven characteristics:
(1) a cargo capacity behind the front row of seats that is 100 cubic feet or
greater and less than 200 cubic feet;
(2) a body structure, width, and seat configuration capable of providing full
walk-through mobility from the front seat row to the third seat row, or at least
partial walk through mobility from either, (a) the front seat row to the second
seat row, or (b) the second seat row to the third seat row;
(3) a hood that is sloping and a short distance from the cowl to the front
bumper relative to the overall length of the vehicle;
(4) a gross vehicle weight that is less than 6,000 pounds;
(5) a height that is between 62 and 75 inches;
(6) a single, box-like structure that envelopes both the space for the driver and
front-seat passenger and the rear space (which has flat or nearly flat floors and
is usable for carrying passengers and cargo); and
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Department of Commerce then turned to defime the appropriate period of
investigation"' and decided to expand it from October 1, 1990 through
May 1, 1991 for Mazda because it would more accurately reflect
Mazda's seasonal pricing."'
Regarding fair value comparisons, the Department of Commerce compared United States new minivan sales to comparable new minivan sales
in Japan."' In making this comparison, the Department of Commerce
based the United States price". on the exporter's sales price"" and

(7) a rear side passenger access door (or doors) and a rear door (or doors) that
provide wide and level access to the rear area.
Id.
The Department of Commerce also declared that a vehicle need not meet all
seven criteria for consideration as a new minivan. Id. The Department of Commerce
did identify, however, interior space as the most meaningful of the seven criteria. Id.
110. Id.The Department of Commerce found that the period of investigation for
this dumping investigation should begin for Toyota on December 1,1990 and end on
May 31, 1991, but for Mazda it should begin two months earlier. Id. at 44-45. General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford, the petitioners, requested that the period of investigation commence two months earlier, in October of 1990, and offered a number of
reasons:
(1) To capture all post sale price adjustments which occur on sales of
minivans;
(2) To account for the possibility of seasonal price variations;
(3) To account for potential price manipulation by [Mazda and Toyota] which
may have been triggered by media speculation in Japan of a possible
antidumping petition prior to its filing.
Id.
Both Mazda and Toyota objected to this request because they believed these
adjustments would be accurately reported during the actual investigation. Id. Furthermore, Toyota argued that the petitioners had not provided any "factual support" to
warrant a broadening of the period of investigation. Id.
111. Id. at 44-45 (stating that the expansion of the period of investigation is the
most effective mechanism to address seasonal pricing practices). The Department of
Commerce indicated, however, that based upon the evidence, there was no "factual
basis" for modifying Toyota's period of investigation. Id. at 45.
112. Prelhmnary Determination, supra note 35, at 45.
113. Id. at 45. United States price is defined in the Tariff Act of 1930 as "the
purchase price or the exporter's sales price of the merchandise, whichever is appropriate." 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a) (1988). The purchase price is defined in the Act as "the
price at which merchandise is purchased, or agreed to be purchased, prior to the date
of importation, from a reseller or the manufacturer or producer of the merchandise for
exportation to the United States." 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (1988).
114. Preliminary Determination, supra note 35, at 45. Exporter's sales price is
defined by the Act as- "the price at which merchandise is sold or likely to be sold in
the United States, before or after the time of importation, by or for the account of

1134

AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 10:3

foreign market value."' Foreign market value was determined by com-

paring the volume of Mazda's and Toyota's new minivan home market
sales with the volume of new minivan sales to third markets." 6 Finally, if the Department of Commerce issues an affirmative final determination, the ITC must ascertain whether there is a material injury or a
threat of material injury to the United States minivan industry." 7

the exporter .... " 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(c) (1993). The Department of Commerce calculated the exporter's sales price based upon "delivered prices
to unrelated customers in the United States." Preliminary Determination, supra note
35, at 45. In calculating the exporter's sales price, the Department of Commerce, in
accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (d) & (e), made a variety of adjustments to the
United States price, including freight, brokerage and handling, and post sale incentives. Id. The Department of Commerce also reduced all the value added to the
minivan after its importation. Id. The United States value added includes production
costs from minivan sales "and a proportional amount of profit or loss." Id. All sales
costs are deducted from the minivan's sales price. The following three factors were
considered in calculating the minivan's production costs: (1) manufacturing costs (2)
movement expenses and (3) general expenses, such as research and development,
sales, and administrative and interest expenses. Id.
115. Preliminary Determination, supra note 35, at 45. Foreign market value is
defined in the Tariff Act of 1930 as:
the price, at the time the merchandise is first sold within the United States by
the person for whom .. the merchandise is imported to any other person
who is not described [in the constructed value section] . . . (A) at which such
or similar merchandise is sold or . . . offered for sale in the principal markets
of the country from which exported, in the usual commercial quantities and in
the ordinary course of trade for home consumption, or (B) if not sold or offered for sale for home consumption, or . . . the quantity sold for home consumption is so small in relation to the quantity sold for exportation to countries
other than the United States as to form an inadequate basis for comparison,
then the price at which so sold or offered for sale for exportation to countries
other than the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l) (1988).
116. Preliminary Determination, supra note 35, at 46. Foreign market value based
on sales to a third country is calculated "based on the price at which such or similar
merchandise is sold or offered for sale to a third country, plus when not included in
the price . .. other expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition packed
ready for shipment to the United States." 19 C.F.R. § 353.49(a)(1) (1993). The Department of Commerce found that Toyota and Mazda had "viable home markets" for
the sale of new minivans during the period of investigation. Preliminary Determination, supra note 35, at 46. Currency or exchange rate conversions, which are necessary in comparing the price of Japanese and American minivans, were made using
established exchange rates at the time of the United States transaction date and were
certified by the Federal Reserve Bank. Id. at 47.
117. Preliminary Determination, supra note 35, at 47.

1995]

RECLASSIFICATION AND DUMPING DISPUTES

1135

On May 26, 1992, the Department of Commerce issued its final determination that Japanese minivans were sold at less than fair value."'
After restating its position regarding the investigation's scope, the Department of Commerce began a more in-depth analysis of fair value
comparisons by comparing United States price to foreign market
value" 9 and concluded that well over 90% of Toyota and Mazda's
new minivan home market sales were priced below the minivan's actual
cost of production.Y It also compared sales of new United States
minivans to foreign market value based on their constructed value'
and investigated whether there were sufficient home market sales of new
minivans to calculate foreign market value."

118. Final Determination, supra note 37.
119. Id. at 21,938; see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (defining United
States price and foreign market value under the Act).
120. Final Determination, supra note 37, at 21,938. Cost of production is defined
as "the cost of materials, fabrication, and general expenses, but excluding profit, incurred in producing such or similar merchandise." 19 C.F.R. § 353.51(c). To obtain
this information, the Department of Commerce solicits information through a cost of
production questionnaire, which "consists of a detailed set of questions seeking to
elicit comprehensive cost information from the respondent for its most recently completed fiscal year." PATrSON, supra note 31, at § 5.05[7].
121. Id. at § 5.05[4]. If the Department of Commerce cannot determine foreign
market value based upon home market or third country sales, it may use constructed
value to calculate foreign market value. ld.;
see 19 U.S.C. "§ 1677b(a)(2) (1988) (stating that the constructed value of the merchandise may be utilized in determining its
foreign market value). Constructed value is calculated based on the sum of the cost
of materials, fabrication or processing, general expenses and profit, and the costs
associated with preparing the merchandise for shipment to the United States. 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1)(A)-(C) (1988); see 19 C.F.R. § 353.50 (1993) (listing the same
criteria for calculating the constructed value).
122. Final Determination, supra note 37, at 21,939. Foreign market value is calculated by comparing the volume of new minivan home market sales to third country
new minivan sales. Id. In order to determine whether the home market prices were
above or below the cost of production, the Department of Commerce calculated the
cost of production based on Mazda and Toyota's "cost of materials, labor, other fabrication costs and general expenses." Id. at 21,939-40. Mazda contended that its home
market was not sufficiently representative for calculating foreign market value Id. at
21,939. The Department of Commerce disagreed, however, stating that the percentage
of Mazda's home market to third market sales was "viable" and therefore, adequate to
calculate foreign market value. Id.
If, however, sales in the home market country are deficient, foreign market
value is calculated the following way:
Except as provided in § 353.53, if the quantity of such or similar merchandise
sold during the period being examined for consumption in the home market
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In analyzing the issue of transfer pricing," the Department of Commerce took the unusual step of examining the "keiretsu system," the

close relationship that exists between the auto makers and their suppliers. 24 Toyota contended that its reported transfer prices for parts supplied by both related and unrelated companies were accurate and maintained that it had "arms length" business transactions"z with its related

country is so small in relation to the quantity sold for exportation to third

countries (normally, less than 5% of the amount sold to third countries) that it
is an inadequate basis for the foreign market value of the merchandise . . .the

foreign market value of the merchandise [will be calculated] under either
§ 353.49 or § 353.50.
19 C.F.R. § 353.48(a) (1993).
123. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2) (1988). Transfer pricing or a transaction directly or
indirectly between related parties may be disregarded if:
in the case of any element of value required to be considered, the amount
representing that element does not fairly reflect the amount usually reflected in
sales in the market under consideration of merchandise under consideration. If a
transaction is disregarded .. .the determination . . .shall be based on the best

evidence available as to what the amount would have been if the transaction
had not occurred between [related parties] ....
Id. Transfer pricing is not based on an arms length agreement between competing
parties, but on what a parent corporation decides to send to its affiliate, which does
not necessarily reflect the product's actual fair market value. Professor Joel R. Paul,
Address at the American University, Washington College of Law, (Feb. 9, 1994).
124. Final Determination, supra note 37, at 21,942. The Act defines related parties
in the following manner
(B) Any officer or director of an organization and such organization.
(C) Partners.
(D) Employer and employee.
(E) Any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power
to vote, 5% or more of the outstanding voting stock or shares of any organization and such organization.
(F) Two or more persons directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or
under common control with, any person.
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(4)(B)-(F) (1988).
A related company is one that is subject to some form of corporate control or
influence by another company during its normal business practices or transactions,
while an unrelated company is one that maintains an independent business relationship
such that its business transactions with another company are considered to be "at
arms length." Final Determination, supra note 37, at 21,941; see Auerbach & Brown,
supra note 34, at Al (stating that the decision to examine the keiretsu system played
an important role in the Commerce Department's conclusion that the Japanese were
selling minivans at less than their fair value).
125. Final Determination, supra note 37, at 21,941-42. An arms length transaction
is defined as a "transaction negotiated by unrelated parties, each acting in his or her
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companies." The Department of Commerce found otherwise, however,
citing considerable data collected on transactions between Toyota and its
related and unrelated suppliers and a "systematic pattern of differences"
in home market versus third market parts pricing." Based on these
analyses, the Commerce Department issued its final determination and
concluded that Toyota and Mazda sold minivans in the United States at
less than fair value."
B. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION DETERMINATION
OF MATERIAL INJURY OR THREAT OF MATERIAL INJURY

On January 22, 1992, the ITC began its inquiry into the claim that
imports of Japanese minivans were being sold at less than fair value
within the meaning of section 733(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930.'" In
order to determine whether there is a material injury or a threat of material injury to a domestic United States industry, the ITC defined the
like product and relevant industry."

own self interest; the basis for a fair market value determination. A transaction in
good faith in the ordinary course of business by parties with independent interests."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 109 (6th ed. 1990).
126. Final Determination, supra note 37, at 21,941. Toyota offered four reasons to
accept the current data without modification:
(1) All of reported prices verified;
(2) Toyota uses the same procedures to negotiate prices with all of its suppliers;
(3) The material and components supplied by related parties were sold at prices
that were above the supplier's fully allocated costs of production; and
(4) There is no indication that prices differed between Estima [the Japanese
version of the Previa] and Previa parts from the same supplier.
Id
127. Final Determination, supra note 37, at 21,942. Interestingly, the Department
of Commerce came to this conclusion despite its lack of comparative data on unrelated party transactions, often used as a benchmark to assess the accuracy of the transfer pricing data. Id. Despite this data, Commerce contended that it observed a pattern
that was "not consistent with an arm's-length negotiating process." Id.; see Auerbach
& Brown, supra note 34, at Al (stating that the Department of Commerce investigators found a "systematic pattern of lower prices for parts going into export models
compared to the prices charged for parts destined for vehicles which are to be sold
in Japan.").
128. Final Determination, supra note 37, at 21,957-58.
129. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b) (1988).
130. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1988) (defining "like product" as "a product which is
like, or in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses with, the article subject to an investigation . . . "). The ITC relied on six factors in defining "like
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The ITC considered whether the minivan production of Chrysler Canada, Ltd., a Canadian subsidiary of Chrysler, should be included as part
of the overall United States domestic minivan industry.'31 While General Motors, Chrysler and Ford conceded that the Act precludes consideration of production operations outside the United States, they asserted
that the ITC should not ignore the injury to domestic producers, measured in part by their inability to sell Canadian-assembled minivans in

product" for purposes of this investigation:
(1) physical characteristics and end uses;
(2) interchangeability of the products;
(3) channels of distribution;
(4) producer and consumer perceptions;
(5) common manufacturing facilities and employees, and;
(6) price, where appropriate.
Minivans From Japan: Determination of the Commission in Investigation No. 731-TA522 (Final) Under the Tariff Act of 1930, Together With the Information Obtained in
the Investigation, USITC Pub. 2529, Inv. No. 731-TA-522 [hereinafter Minivans From
Japan] (July 1992) at 3 n.3.
The ITC declared that its preliminary definition of "like product" included only
minivans and vehicles such as "station wagons, full size vans and sport utility vehicles." See id. at 5 (stating that since none of the parties had challenged the preliminary definition of "like product" the ITC included only minivans in its final determination). While recognizing that there is some degree of market overlap or substitutability between minivans, station wagons, vans, and sport utility vehicles, the ITC
explained that these vehicles do not serve an adequate portion of the minivan market.
Id. Furthermore, minivans are produced at assigned facilities in the United States
which cannot be modified easily to produce other classes of vehicles while expanding
the "product" of the investigation to include such a broad spectrum of passenger
vehicles would significantly alter the ITC's narrow investigative scope. Id. at 6.
The Tariff Act of 1930 defines the relevant "industry" as "the domestic producers as a whole of a like product, or those producers whose collective output of
the like product constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of that
product." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1988). Some have estimated that General Motors,
Ford, and Chrysler's collective output of minivans dominate the domestically-produced
minivan industry, controlling at least 85% of the minivan market. A Vehicle to Ditch,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 3, 1993, at 10.
131. See Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 7 (reaffirming the
Commission's preliminary determination that while the overall consequences of
dumped or subsidized minivans must be considered, it must be carried out only by an
analysis of United States domestic production operations); cf. Asociacion Colombiana
de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 693 F. Supp. 1155, 1167 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988) (determining which domestically-produced products are most "like" the products
under the investigation is essential before moving onto a more detailed examination as
to whether the domestic industry is materially injured or threatened with material
injury).
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the United States as a result of illegally dumped Japanese imported
minivans in the United States."
Petitioners also asserted that the ITC must consider "lost minivan
sales" on the domestic industry's ability to sell less fuel efficient vehicles under the corporate average fuel economy standards and future lost
minivan sales due to "brand loyalty" developed from a buyer's initial
vehicle purchase.' While acknowledging its discretionary authority to
consider all relevant economic factors and its authority to measure all
such factors that have an influence on the industry in question, the ITC
rejected petitioners' arguments primarily because it believed it was statutorily obligated to follow the statute's specific instructions, which preclude the consideration of any United States-owned foreign production
operations.' In short, the 1TC concluded that it could not define the

132. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 7. This particular argument was articulated by Chrysler Motor Corporation, which operates a substantial minivan manufacturing facility in Ontario, Canada. Id.Since its parts and components from its
domestic assembly plant are also used in its Canadian assembly operations, Chrysler
asserted that the overall loss of its Canadian sales due to dumped Japanese minivans
"has a direct adverse impact on the per-unit material costs associated with [its] United
States assembly operations.' Id.
133. Id. Specifically, petitioners contended that the Act authorizes the ITC to consider "other economic factors" relevant to its determination and that the Act allows
the ITC to examine all "relevant factors" having an influence on the condition of the
at 8.
industry. lId.
134. Id.; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) (1988) (outlining the factors used in
determining the impact of imports on the domestic industry). In addition, the Commission could not use customary statutory provisions to analyze "other relevant economic factors" in place of the more specific provisions relating to the definition of
"the industry" and the "like product" because to do so would unnecessarily broaden
the scope of its investigation. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 8-9; see 2A
Sutherland Stat. Constr. (1992) § 46.05 at 105 (stating when there is a conflict between a statute's general and specific terms, the statute's specific terms should prevail
over its more general terms), cited with approval in Minivans From Japan, supra
note 130, at 7. The ITC also looked to the legislative history and determined that in
measuring the impact of imports on the United States industry, the consideration of
relevant factors does not include offshore production operations of a United States
business. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 9 & n.25 (citing S. REP. No. 71,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 115, 117 (1987) and H.R. REP. No. 100, Part 1, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 128-29 (1987)) (instructing the International Trade Commission not to consider profits from the import operations of the domestic industry).
Furthermore, the Tariff Act of 1930 does not define the "industry" to encompass all "operations of a legal entity identified as producing a like product" nor to
include "producers of related products, or upstream products, such as parts and components." Id. at 10. This product line provision is defined as "domestic producers as
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"relevant industry" for minivans to encompass the automobile industry
as a whole.'35
Before examining material injury, the ITC first addressed the related
parties issue 36 and found no direct evidence that either Ford or Chrysler had exercised any meaningful influence or control over their related
firms with regard to the marketing or sale of minivans.'" The ITC al-

a whole of a like product, or those producers whose collective output of the like
product constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of that product." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1988). Because this provision affords an exception to
the general principle that "relevant" operations are limited to those that produce a
"like product," the ITC declined to carve out an additional exception to the statute's
requirements. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 11 n.34, citing Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. United States, 898 F.2d 780, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that the
ITC must not read additional exceptions into the statute absent specific or contrary
legislative intent).
135. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 10 (refusing to accept petitioners'
contention that the loss of sales of Canadian minivans due to less than fair value
minivan imports should be considered "relevant" because it harms the domestic
minivan industry through higher per unit costs for minivan parts and components).
136. Id. at 13-14. According to the Act, related parties may be used:
When some producers are related to the exporters or importers, or are themselves importers of the allegedly subsidized or dumped merchandise, the term
'industry' may be applied in appropriate circumstances by excluding such producers from those included in that industry.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(B) (1988); see supra note 124 (outlining the statutory provision
for related parties). In deciding whether to apply the related parties provision, the ITC
should consider "whether the domestic producer substantially benefits from the relation
to the subject imports." Empire Plow Co. v. United States, 675 F. Supp. 1348, 1353
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). In directing an analysis of related parties, the ITC maintains
broad discretion in addressing the facts of each individual dumping investigation. See
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) (granting broad agency discretion in the interpretation of United States antidumping laws unless the interpretation is held unreasonable); see also Empire Plow,
675 F. Supp. at 1351-52 (stating that the administrative agency "has broad discretion
in the enforcement of the trade laws" and has the discretionary right to invoke the
related parties provision when undertaking a factual determination) (citation omitted).
137. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 13-14. In its preliminary investigation, the ITC identified Chrysler and Ford as "related parties" for the following reasons: (1) "Ford's significant equity interest in Mazda," which exports minivans to the
United States; (2) "Ford's joint venture with Nissan to produce a minivan in the
United States"; and (3) "Chrysler's significant equity interest in Mitsubishi," which
exported minivans to the United States during the investigative period. Id. According
to the ITC, Ford has a 25% interest in Mazda, and Chrysler owns 5.88% of
Mitsubishi stock. Id. at A-35. Information on General Motors' ownership interest in
Isuzu Motors, Ltd. and in Suzuki was not disclosed. Id. at A-36.
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so concluded it was inappropriate to include Ford and Chrysler as related parties simply because of their respective financial interest in Mazda
and Mitsubishi. 38
Having examined the related parties issue, the ITC commenced its
material injury analysis by considering the volume of imports, the effect
of imports, the impact of imports and other economic factors relevant to
its determination.'39 Before addressing the volume of minivan imports,
the ITC discussed the minivan industry as a whole, paying particular
attention to those economic factors having a significant impact on the
industry." ° The ITC identified the 1990-91 economic recession and the
Persian Gulf Conflict as relevant economic factors affecting the United
States automobile industry because of their combined effect on consumer
demand, particularly on such high value consumer purchases as
minivans. 4' Because the statutory analysis of economic factors must

138. Id. at 13-15.
139. The Tariff Act of 1930 instructs the Commission to consider.
(1) the volume of imports of the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation,
(I) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States for
like products, and
(H) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of like
products, but only in the context of production operations within the United
States; and
(ii) may consider such other economic factors as are relevant to the deterrnination regarding whether there is material injury by reason of imports.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i) (1988) (emphasis added).
140. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 16-18.
141. Id. at 16. The Commission also determined that the minivan industry is "not
yet mature, and is still growing and evolving." Id. at 17. Because the market is
growing, the Commission stated that the introduction of a new minivan could increase
the size of the market by attracting new buyers without actually reducing the existing
market share of other minivan producers. Id. at 17-18. The minivan market is expected to follow recognized product cycles for automobiles, beginning with the attainment
of high sales volume within the first three years of the minivan's introduction, followed by industry efforts to maintain its market share through a variety of incentives
including styling, increased standard equipment and new vehicle options. Id. at 18.
Other important economic factors include: the completion of a new labor contract in 1990 (reducing the domestic industry's ability to reduce its overall costs when
the demand for minivans was declining); the lack of uniformity in minivan pricing
(ndicating the unsurprising fact that consumers do not pay equal prices for the same
vehicle, and they are less likely to be cognizant of and responsive to fluctuations in
minivan prices); the failed introduction of the "APV triplets" by General Motors during 1989 and 1990; the negative press reported in Automotive News regarding the
Chrysler Caravan's ultradrive transmission; and the negative impact of domestic in-
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also be made in the context of the competitiveness of the affected industry, the ITC noted that petitioners hold a substantial segment of the
domestic minivan market-possibly as high as 85%.42
With regard to the weighed economic factors, the ITC reported that
the overall market conditions in the minivan industry were "mixed"
during 1989 and 1990 and largely deteriorated from 1990 to 1991." 3
While the domestic industry's capacity utilization declined from 87.5%
in 1989 to 70% in 1991, it nevertheless "remained profitable during the
period of investigation."'" Despite the recognized relationship between
the minivan industry's economic performance and the nation's more
general economic conditions, the statute specifically requires that the
material injury be directly caused or "by reason of the LTFV im45

ports.'

1

The Act also directs the ITC to examine whether there is an increase
in the Volume of imports, either in absolute or relative terms to the
production or consumption, or whether the actual volume of merchandise
imports is meaningful.'" After weighing the evidence, the ITC found

dustry "fleet sales" on the domestic automobile industry's ability to maintain a stable
market share for their new minivans sales. Id. at 18-20. "Fleet sales" are the sale of
minivans typically used by major rental car companies for a short period of
time-usually only several months. Id. at 20, A-43. Most often, fleet cars generally
have low mileage, and because they are sold at such a substantial discount, they
provide a real value to the consumer when compared to newer and costlier minivans.
Id. at A-43.
142. Id. at 22. While the data on market share is considered confidential and was
not released to the public in the Commission's final determination, many industry
analysts believe the domestic minivan producers hold more than an 85% share of the
domestic minivan market. See Welfare Compromise for Auto Makers, N.Y. TIMEs,
Feb. 18, 1993, at A22 (reporting that the United States automobile industry "already
controls over 90% of the minivan market" and would, therefore, gain an insignificant
number of additional vehicle sales); see also A Vehicle to Ditch, supra note 130, at
10 (stating that the United States dominates the American minivan market, with a
United States market share that is estimated at over 85%).
143. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 20.
144. Id. The domestic industry remained profitable even though operating income
fell from $1.2 billion in 1989 to $481 million in 1991, the number of workers in the
domestic automobile industry declined, as did worker hours, wages, total compensation
and worker productivity in 1991. Id. at 20-21.
145. Id. at 21 (emphasis added); see Chaparral Steel v. United States, 901 F.2d
1097, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that the focus of the ITC determination is
whether the United States domestic industry is currently experiencing material injury
as a direct consequence of the imported products).
146. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 21-22. With regard to the volume
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that the volume or the increase in the volume of the Japanese market
share comprised too small a share of the domestic minivan market to
constitute a "significant" market share." The slight increase in Japanese market share during 1990 resulted from the introduction of the
Toyota Previa to the American market." According to the ITC, even
though the introduction of the Previa led to an increase in the Japanese
market share, it also occurred during a period of a small expansion of
domestic minivan sales. 49 This finding formed an important component
of the ITC's overall unwillingness to find material injury because even
though the percentage of the Japanese minivan market share was increasing at the expense of the domestic minivan industry's market share,
the overall number of minivans produced by Japanese and United States
manufacturers was increasing."s In short, even though domestic producers lost a small percentage of their minivan market share, they nonetheless increased their overall volume of minivan production due to a
steady increase in United States consumer demand for both domestically
produced and imported minivans.'

of imported merchandise, the statute states that the ITC shall "consider whether the
volume of imports of the merchandise, or any increase in that volume, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the United States, is significant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i) (1988).
147. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130. at 22 (finding that the Japanese have
never held more than a 15% share of the domestic minivan market).
148. See id. (stating that the significant increase in the Japanese market share was
almost exclusively the result of the sales of the newly introduced Toyota Previa).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. For example, suppose that 100,000 minivans were produced and sold in the
United States by the United States and Japan in 1990. The United States minivan
industry produced and sold 85,000 minivans, giving the United States an 85% share
of the market. Japan produced and sold 15,000 minivans in the United States in
1990, giving it a 15% share of the minivan market. In 1991, however, due to a large
increase in consumer demand, both the United States and Japan combined to produce
and sell 125,000 minivans in the United States. The United States produces and sells
105,000 minivans, while the Japanese produce and sell 20,000 minivans. Both the
United States and Japan have increased their volume of minivans produced and sold.
The United States sold 20,000 more minivans than it did during the previous year
(85,000 minus 105,000), even though its market share has slightly decreased from
85% to 84%. Japan, on the other hand, sold 5,000 more minivans than it did in 1990
and increased its market share by only 1%. While it is true that Japan has captured a
marginally greater share of the increase in minivan sales in 1991 (20% of the 25,000
additional minivan sales), both sides have substantially benefitted from the increase in
demand for minivans in 1991 despite a slight downward change in the United States
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Recognizing that a small volume of imports may still have a significant impact on the United States domestic market, the ITC examined the
effect of Japanese imports on domestic prices of similar products and
considered whether there has been "significant price underselling of
imports" and whether the underselling has dramatically depressed prices
or prevented increases in price that might otherwise have occurred.152
The ITC concluded that because prices steadily rose between 1989 and
1990, it was unlikely that prices had been depressed. 53 The ITC then
identified several other applicable factors in its consideration of price
suppression, such as the extent of substitutability, the accessibility of
fairly traded imports, the resale of minivans and non-substitute vehicles,
the amount of the import market share, and the dumping margin. 54
In addressing the minivan's relative substitutability, the ITC found a
substantial product differentiation in the minivan market which indicated
a lack of product substitutability. 55 The ITC then identified other important factors in determining a minivan's substitutability, such as the
vehicle's overall quality and reliability, price, and consumer brand loyalty'56 and concluded that Japanese minivans generally are considered57
more reliable and of higher quality than their domestic counterparts.
Equally important, the ITC maintained that the likelihood of minivan
substitutability is further diminished because Japanese minivans are more
expensive than domestically produced minivans.' 8
market share.
152. Id. at 23-24.
153. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 24.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 24-25 (identifying additional differences such as a vehicle's engine
size, options, safety, styling, and front versus rear wheel drive capability). There are a
number of notable differences between Japanese-designed minivans and their American-made counterparts. The majority of Japanese minivans are sold with four cylinder
engines while virtually all of the domestic minivans are sold with larger six cylinder
engines. Id. at 25. Nearly all Japanese minivans are sold in the United States with
rear wheel drive while the majority of domestic minivans sold have either front wheel
drive or all wheel drive. Id. All Japanese minivans sold in the United States had
standard length wheel bases while domestic minivan sales included both standard and
extended length wheel bases. Id.
156. Id. at 26. With regard to brand loyalty, the ITC concluded that although it is
an important non-price factor affecting consumer's choice, the data tended to indicate
that there was very little "cross shopping" or comparison between those who were
interested the domestic minivan market and those who were more interested in the
imported minivan market. Id. at 27.
157. Id. at 26.
158. See Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 27-28 (declaring that studies
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The ITC examined the actual pricing data of less than fair value
imports and the availability of fairly traded imports and concluded that
for the most part while imported Japanese minivan prices tended to
increase at a greater level than their United States counterparts, there
was no evidence of price suppression by Toyota and Mazda. 9 With
regard to the availability and price effects of fairly traded imports, the
ITC found that the smaller the difference between the import's dumped
and fair value price, the lower overall effect dumped import sales will
have on domestic minivan sales and pricing." After evaluating all imported and domestically produced minivan pricing, the ITC concluded
that imported minivan pricing data did not demonstrate meaningful underselling largely because of inconsistencies and defects in minivan
pricing data and limited substitutability between United States and Japanese minivans."'
The ITC turned its attention to the third prong of the Act: the impact
indicated a wide variation in price ranges significantly reduces substitutability and
finding many consumers in the market for a domestically produced minivans are more
price conscious than those in the market for imported minivans).
159. See id. at 28 (stating that between 1989 and 1991, prices of Japanese
minivans increased by 15%, while domestic minivan prices increased by only 4%
during the period); cf. Maine Potato Council v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 1237,
1246 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (finding that the ITC must explain how it addressed
quality differences between products absent a finding of price suppression and show
the impact of its findings on its material injury determination).
160. See Minivans From Japan, supra note 130. at 29 (finding a 9.72% weighted
average dumping margin and that Toyota Previas were sold at 6.41%75 less than their
fair market value, while the Mazda MPV were sold at 12.70% less than their fair
market value).
The 1TC agreed with the Commerce Department's determination that even if
Japanese imports had been fairly traded, a lack of product substitutability coupled
with a narrow market share would preclude a substantial increase in demand for
domestically produced minivans. Id. at 29-30. Consequently, due to the minimal effect
of limited market share and low vehicle substitutability on consumer demand for
domestically produced minivans, the ITC found that there would be very little incentive to increase domestic minivan prices. Id. at 30. In other words, those in the market for a higher-priced Japanese minivan would probably have either spent the extra
money for the same vehicle or considered purchasing an entirely different class of
vehicle. Id. at 29-30.
161. Id. at 30-31. The Commission also was reluctant to examine or rely on data
reflecting "constructed prices" and not actual industry pricing. Id. at 30. While the
pricing data used by the United States and Japanese automobile industries was not
made available to the public because it would reveal confidential operations of the
parties in question, the data was considered too questionable to warrant serious consideration in the price effect portion of the investigation. Id. at 30, xvi.
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of less than fair value imports on domestic producers of like products.'62 Due to a negligible Japanese minivan sales volume in the domestic minivan market, coupled with a lack of significant import price
effects, the ITC could not find a "sufficient impact" on the United
States industry by the sale of Japanese minivans to permit a material
injury determination.'63 In addition to the economic recession and the
Persian Gulf Conflict, the ITC attributed the loss of new minivan sales
to domestic industry sales to fleet buyers, such as rental car companies,
because the resale of these rental minivans has a negative effect on the
domestic minivan industry's ability to sell their newer model year
minivans.'"
Petitioners offered two arguments to support their basic position that
less than fair value minivan sales from Japan harm domestic minivan
sales. First, they claimed that Mazda and Toyota sold their minivans

162. In assessing the impact of imports on the domestic industry, the Act instructs
the ITC to "evaluate all relevant economic factors" including:
(I) actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, and utilization of capacity,
(II) factors affecting domestic prices,
(III) actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment,
wages growth, ability to raise capital, and investment, and
(IV) actual and potential negative effects on the existing development and production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or more advanced version of the like product.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(3) (1988); see Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 31
(noting that the Commission considered the following relevant factors in assessing the
impact of LTFV imports on the domestic minivan industry: "U.S. consumption, production, shipments, capacity utilization, employment, wages, financial performance,
capital investment, and research and development expenses."); see also Torrington Co.
v. United States, 747 F. Supp. 744 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), affd, 938 F.2d 1276 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (finding that the ITC has the statutory authority to decide on domestic
products in its consideration of like products, and that such a determination will be
sustained if supported by "substantial evidence").
163. See Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 32 (supporting its position that
the primary reason for the decline in demand for minivans in 1990 and 1991 to
below 1989 levels was due largely to the economic recession and the Persian Gulf
conflict); see also supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (discussing the impact
of the Persian Gulf conflict and the economic recession on consumer demand).
164. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 32-33. It is readily apparent why
fleet minivan sales erode the ability of the United States minivan industry to sell its
new vehicles. Fleet minivans are usually several months old and have low mileage
when they are repurchased and made available to the public. Id. In short, these fleet
minivans offer the consumer the opportunity to purchase virtually the same vehicle at
a lower price, often with similar warranty protection as a newer minivan model. Id.
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increasingly in the "higher-end" price range which offers more substantial per unit profit than lesser priced vehicles.' The ITC rejected this
argument because the domestic minivan industry had a greater comparative increase in sales in the high end market than imported minivans
produced by Japan." Second, in order to recover lost profits, petitioners asserted that Toyota and Mazda raised their 1992 minivan prices,
leading to a 4.2% decline in market share between the third quarter of
1991 and April 1992." The ITC, however, declined to speculate as to
the reasons for the decrease in Japanese market share and the increase
in United States market share by relying on "incomplete" or "interim
data" that extended beyond the ITC's investigative period."
In drawing its conclusions, the ITC strongly reiterated its basic position that while many of these factors were detrimental to the United
States minivan industry and may have independently contributed to the
domestic minivan market's injury, the Act requires the ITC to determine
whether the United States minivan industry is "materially injured by
reason of the dumped imports."'" Furthermore, the ITC concluded that

165. Id. at 33.
166. Id. at 33-34. Unfortunately, the data used to support this position was designated confidential because it would reveal sensitive material relating to the operations
and sales of individual producers. Id. at xvi.
167. Id. at 33-34. Petitioners maintained that as a "direct result" of this large
price increase, United States manufactured minivan sales expanded. Id. at 34. The
implication here is that Toyota and Mazda deliberately underpriced their minivans sold
in the United States between July 1991 and June 1992 in order to gain a share of
the United States markeL Once Toyota and Mazda achieved this market share, they
raised their minivan prices to normal or above average levels in order to recover lost
profits when they sold these vehicles at less than fair market value. Id.
168. Id. at 33-34. While the ITC declined to rely on "interim data," even if the
interim data was given consideration there was no evidence to conclude that the increase in United States minivan sales was directly related to the expansion of Japanese minivan prices. Id. at 34-35. Although there was no evidence in the record to
support them, the ITC offered a number of "other factors" which "might explain" the
increase in domestic minivan sales during the period including- a lessening of the
economic recession, favorable reviews and increased sales of Chrysler's new minivan
model, and Chrysler's successful sales campaign regarding minivan incentive offerings.
Id. at 35.
169. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added); see supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text
(discussing the economic recession, the Persian Gulf Conflict, notable problems with
domestic minivan models, the aging of certain domestic minivan models, competition
resulting from increased fleet sales, a industry labor agreement which significantly
raised domestic labor costs on minivans, and competition for low- end minivan buyers
from Chrysler's Canadian operations as factors that adversely affected the United
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due to reasons of limited substitutability within the minivan industry,
Toyota's and Mazda's small percentage of the overall minivan market,
and the introduction of the Toyota Previa, even if Toyota and Mazda
had sold their minivans at fair value prices, it was probable that American consumers would continue to purchase imported Japanese minivans
over their domestic counterparts." 0
The ITC also investigated whether the threat of material injury to the
United States minivan industry by imported Japanese minivans existed
and considered several criteria in support of its overall position that
there is no threat of material injury to the domestically produced
minivan industry absent any substantial evidence of an actual threat and
imminent injury. 7' In particular, the ITC considered the following criteria: production capacity; import market penetration; suppressing price
effects; underutilized capacity; adverse trends; and potential negative
effects."

States minivan industry during 1991 and 1992).
170. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 36. While there was an increase in
market share for Japanese minivan imports during 1989 and 1990, it was largely due
to the introduction of a new minivan model-the Toyota Previa-which carried a
weighted dumping average of 9.72%. Id. Due to the small Japanese market share, any
increase in demand within the United States minivan market would not lead to sufficient increased sales or prices that would enable the ITC to find material injury. Id.
See generally Report To The President on Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies, USITC Pub. No. TA-201-44 (Dec. 3, 1980) (indicating the difficulty
in establishing that an importing country's products have caused substantial injury or
threat of injury to the United States industry).
171. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 38; see § 1677(7)(F)(i) (1988) of
the Tariff Act of 1930 (outlining the factors to be used in assessing whether there is
a threat of material injury); see also § 1677(7)(F)(ii) (1988) (stating that the ITC
determination of a threat of material injury "shall be made on the basis of evidence
that the threat of material injury is real and the actual injury is imminent . . . [and]
may not be made on the basis of mere conjecture or supposition."); S. Rep. No. 249,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. 89, (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 474 (1979)
(instructing the ITC "to consider the likelihood of actual material injury occurring" in
making a determination regarding the threat of material injury).
172. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 37-38. Pursuant to § 1677 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, the ITC is required to consider the following criteria:
(II) any increase in production capacity or existing unused capacity in the
exporting country likely to result in a significant increase in imports of the
merchandise to the United States,
(M) any rapid increase in United States market penetration and the likelihood
that the penetration will increase to an injurious level,
(V) the probability that imports of the merchandise will enter the United States
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In considering production capacity, the ITC found that while production capacity increased during the period of investigation, capacity utilization continued at elevated levels as well." The ITC found that Japan and other overseas export markets for minivans have assimilated
large quantities of minivans as a result of a declining demand for
minivans. 74
The ITC concluded that although import market penetration may have
been earlier in the period of investigation, it did not "rapidly increase"
towards the end of the period-during 1990 and 1991-and more recent
figures demonstrate that the percentage of Japanese minivans is at best
"stable" and at worst "declining."' 75 Furthermore, the ITC found that

at prices that will have a depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices of
the merchandise,
(V) any substantial increase in inventories of the merchandise in the United
States,
(VI) the presence of underutilized capacity for producing the merchandise in the
exporting country,
(VII) any other demonstrable adverse trends that indicate the probability that
importation will be the cause of actual injury,
(X) the actual and potential negative effects on the existing development and
production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or more advanced version of the like product.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(F)(i) (1988) (emphasis added).
Several of the criteria contained in the statute are not addressed by the Commission because the present dispute does not pertain to subsidies (1), a potential for
production shifting (VII), or raw agricultural products (IX). Minivans From Japan,
supra note 130, at 38.
173. Id. at 39. Between 1989 and 1991, production capacity increased from
223,000 units in 1989, to 255,900 units in 1990, to 305,200 units in 1992. Id. at A76. Capacity utilization also increased during the same period from 66.3% in 1989, to
96.6% in 1990, to 83.6% in 1991. Id.; see Philipp Bros. Inc. v. United States, 640 F.
Supp. 1340, 1345-46 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (stating that while an increase in production capacity does not necessarily translate into an increase in exports to the United
States, such figures are useful for the ITC in reaching a determination of the threat
of material injury by LTFV imports).
174. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 39; see id. at Appendix A-76, A77 (indicating that the Japanese are not flooding the United States market with lowerpriced models in order to create demand or market share, but are continuing to absorb increasing quantities of minivans). Both end-of-period inventories and home market shipments increased during 1989, 1990 and 1991. Id. at A-76, A-77.
175. Id. at 38-39. The ITC also stated that even if a "rapid increase" existed, it
would not amount to threat of material injury under the Act because the import market penetration was unlikely to "increase to an injurious level" due to adverse global
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because the statute's threat analysis requires an evidence of "recent
occurrences and factors indicat[ing] that actual injury is imminent," the
data and overall economic conditions did not support such a finding.'76
The ITC asserted that there was little likelihood of imported Japanese
minivans "depressing or suppressing" United States minivan prices'"
and found no risk of a dramatic increase in minivan exports to the
United States due to underutilized minivan production capacity in Japan.' Finally, because inventories of imported Japanese minivans declined during the period of investigation, the ITC found no "substantial
increase in [minivan] inventories" in the United States market. 79
Finally, the ITC examined whether there were any "actual and potential negative effects" on current domestic minivan development and
production and whether these effects are sufficient to warrant finding a
threat of material injury. 8 ' While the United States minivan industry
offered data to show that less than fair value imports have in fact affected their future production and development plans, the ITC refused to
follow such an argument primarily because capital funding by the domestic minivan industry, as well as research and development, continue
to remain at "significant" levels.' After considering all the evidence

economic conditions as well as to a lack of minivan substitutability and product differentiation. Id. at 37-39.
176. Id. at 38-39.
177. Id. at 39; see supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text (stating that due to
limited import market share, limited product substitutability, and pricing data flaws
there is virtually no prospect for Japanese minivan imports suppressing or depressing
United States minivan prices when entering the United States market).
178. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 39; see supra notes 156-63 and
accompanying text (stating that due to limited import market share, limited product
substitutability, and pricing data flaws there is virtually no prospect for Japanese
minivan imports suppressing or depressing United States minivan prices when entering
the United States market). In further support of this position, the ITC also cited declining overall minivan inventories in 1991 as evidence of a lack of import price
suppression. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 39, A-73; see id. at 39 (recognizing that both production capacity and capacity utilization for minivans has increased and that the Japanese and other export markets are continuing to assimilate
even greater quantities of minivans).
179. Id. at 39, A-73. But see Yasua-General Battery v. United States, 661 F. Supp
1214, 1220 (Ct. of Int'l Trade 1987) (stating that declining inventories do not always
indicate an absence of a threat of material injury by LTFV imports).
180. Minivans From Japan, supra note 130, at 38-40.
181. Id. at 40. Ford, Chrysler and General Motors contended that if the Commission allowed Japanese minivan dumping to continue, the chances of redesigning the
Chevrolet APV minivan "will be substantially reduced." Id. at 40 n.154. Figures for
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presented in this investigation, the ITC found the evidence regarding the
potential adverse impact of imported minivans on, the domestically produced minivan industry insufficient to permit a determination of material
injury or threat of material injury by reason of less than fair value imported minivans."
On July 12, 1993, the United States Court of International Trade
upheld the ITC's negative determination of material injury." The
court agreed that the ITC's negative determination "was supported by
substantial evidence" and found that the degree of competition between
Japanese and domestic minivans was "limited" and the resulting impact
on the domestic industry "insignificant.""' Furthermore, the court concluded that the evidence of injury offered by the United States minivan
industry did not amount to material injury and was insufficient to overturn the ITC's negative material injury determination.ts"

capital expenditures were not released to the public, because they would reveal confidential information. Id. at A-68. Research and development data was reported by the
Big Three for the period of investigation. Their combined research and development
expenses were $462 million in FY 1989, S392 million in FY 1990. and $413 million
in FY 1991. Id. at A-69. The ITC, however, refused to read the statute's threat provisions broadly enough to warrant a threat of material injury determination on the
assumption that Japanese imported minivans have hindered the domestically produced
minivan industry's future production and research and development plans. Id. at 40.
182. Id.
183. General Motors Corp. v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 774, 775 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1993).
184. Id. at 779-88 (stating that low and insignificant import volume and market
share, a lack of price depression, suppression, and vehicle underselling due to a lack
of minivan substitutability all supported the ITC's negative finding of material injury).
The court agreed with the Commission's determination that the Toyota Previa was
"largely responsible for increased import market share ...

[and] created a good part

of its own demand." Id. at 788. The court concurred with the Commission's view
that very little cross- or comparison-shopping existed between the Japanese and United
States minivan models. Id.
185. Id. While Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors may have lost the minivan
anti-dumping case before the Commerce Department and the ITC, many in the automobile industry nonetheless assert that they have won an important victory because
Japanese automakers, fearing a negative determination or United States retaliation,
have already increased minivan prices. See Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal
The Antidumping Laws, 13 Nw. J. INT'L LAW & Bus. 491, 521 (1993) (stating that
the Japanese decision to increase minivan prices in order to reduce the likelihood of
United States retaliation ironically leads to a less price competitive United States
minivan industry and in the long run hurts the American consumer because of increased minivan prices); see also Big Three Auto Firms Move to Appeal Decision on

Sales of Toyota Minivans, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1992, at B3 (stating that by bringing
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IV. MPV RECLASSIFICATION AND THE GATT
One of the most contentious issues in international trade law today is
whether the reclassification of multi-purpose vehicles-including twodoor and four-door sport utility vehicles and minivans-constitutes a
violation of the GATr. 6 As previously discussed, the principal advocate of reclassification is the United States automobile industry, which
maintains that a reclassification of multi-purpose vehicles is not illegal
under GATT rules.'87
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF MULTI-PURPOSE
VEHICLE RECLASSIFICATION
Supporters of multi-purpose vehicle reclassification contend that the
classification of multi-purpose vehicles should be based on structural and
design features and not based on auxiliary or cosmetic features which
importers can readily manipulate for their benefit.'
They also assert
that if consumers purchase multi-purpose vehicles primarily for the
transport of persons rather than for the transport of goods, then these
vehicles should also be required to meet the same government mandated
passenger vehicle safety and emission standards. 9 Moreover, advothis action, the United States automobile industry has already won because the investigation has successfully pressured Japanese minivan producers to raise their prices by
12%).
186. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 5 U.N.T.S. 308
[hereinafter GATT]. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) was established during the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment held in Geneva from April 10 to October 30,
1947. 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (Ist ed. 1983). On the

final day of the United Nations Conference, 23 signatories drew up a separate Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT. Id. This Protocol was accepted by the
23 signatories to the Final Act and went into effect on January 1, 1948. Id. at 20-21.
187. See AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, CUSTOMS CLASSIFICATION OF MULTI PURPOSE VEHICLES 1-2 (1993) [hereinafter AMERICAN AUToMoBILE MANUFACTURERS] (stating that reclassifying multi-purpose vehicles at the higher
25% rate would not violate any United States international obligation-including the
GATT).
188. Gwenell Bass, Multipurpose Vehicles-Are they Cars or Trucks?, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, June 18, 1993, at 6.
189. Id. But see Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 1521, 1528
(1993) (stating that the "fact [t]hat Nissan took advantage of legal NHTSA and EPA

classifications to avoid certain 'passenger car' requirements does not alter the outcome
of this tariff case").
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cates of reclassification believe that there is nothing in the GATT or in
any other international trade agreement to which the United States is a
party that prevents an agency of the United States government from
internally classifying multi-purpose vehicles as "trucks" under HTSUS
heading 8704 rather than as passenger vehicles under HTSUS heading
8703.290
In responding to any alleged illegalities under GATT rules, supporters
of multi-purpose vehicle reclassification believe that the United States is
only required to confer on imports from other contracting parties "tariff
treatment that is no less favorable than the most-favored-nation rate
provided for in the tariff schedules of the United States."'' Therefore,
they argue that a reclassification of multi-purpose vehicles is not illegal
under GAT7 Article 1:1 because it is not discriminatory in nature and
instead affects all GATT contracting parties equally."g
Furthermore, proponents of reclassification argue that reclassifying
multi-purpose vehicles would not violate GATT Article H because it
does not require the Customs Service to embrace the views of another
contracting party (namely Japan) when reviewing a particular classification issue.'93 Under the GATT Article 11:5, the importing contracting
party must first agree that its classification is inconsistent with the terms
and conditions of the negotiated tariff concession.' Those who sup190. AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, CLASSIFICATION OF
MPVs AND MINrvANS AND GATr 1 (1992) [hereinafter CLASSIFICATION OF MTVS
AND MINIvANS]; AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 187, at 1.
191. AMEuCAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 187, at 1.Article I of
the GATF provides:
any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to

any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined
for the territories of all other contracting parties.
GAIT, supra note 186, art. 1.
192. AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 187, at 1.
193. Id.at 1-2.
194. Id GATr Article I:5 will only address classification issues if both contracting parties agree to GAT consultations:

If any contracting party considers that a product is not receiving from another
contracting party the treatment which the first contracting party believes to have
been contemplated by a concession provided for in the appropriate Schedule

annexed to this Agreement, it shall bring the matter directly to the attention of
the other contacting party. If the latter agrees that the treatment contemplated
was that claimed by the first contracting party ... the two contracting parties,

together with any other contracting parties substantially interested, shall enter
promptly into further negotiations with a view to compensatory adjustment of
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port reclassification acknowledge that a contracting party has the right to
claim that such a reclassification "nullifies or impairs" the negotiated

and bound 2.5% tariff concession for motor vehicles designed for the
transport of persons, to invoke the dispute resolution procedures under
the GATT Article XXIII,' 9 and to seek consultations under GATT Article XXII.' 9 If Japan pursued this course of action, the United States
would be obligated under the terms and conditions of Article XXII: 1 not
only to consult on the matter, but at the request of the Japanese government, to submit to the dispute resolution procedures previously adopted by all contracting parties under Article XXII:2.' Proponents argue,
however, that simply because Japan raises this reclassification issue and
both contracting parties invoke the dispute settlement procedures, it does

the matter.
GATI', supra note 186, art. 11:5 (emphasis added).
195. AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 187, at 2-3. GATT
Article XXIII provides for the following dispute settlement remedy if a contracting
party believes that a benefit is being nullified or impaired:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that
the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of (a) the failure of any contracting party to carry out its obligations under
this Agreement, or (b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement . . . the
contracting party may . . . make written representations or proposals to the

other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a reasonable time . . . the matter may be referred to the Con-

tracting Parties.
GATT, supra note 186, art. XXIII.
196. AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 187, at 2. GATT Article XXII explains the following conditions under which consultations can exist:
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall
afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as
may be made by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting
the operation of this Agreement.
2. The Contracting Parties may, at the request of a contracting party, consult
with any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has
not been possible to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under
paragraph 1.
GAT, supra note 186, art. XXII.
197. See GATT, supra note 186, art. XXII (discussing the dispute settlement processes and procedures).
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not necessarily follow that multi-purpose vehicle reclassification is a
violation of obligations of the United States under the GATT."' Equally important, supporters of multi-purpose vehicle reclassification maintain
that it is unlikely that a GATT panel would rule in Japan's favor simply
because of Japan's "reasonable expectation" of the overall consequence
of the 1979 harmonized tariff negotiations on automobiles, concluding
that the reclassification of multi-purpose vehicles under HTSUS heading
8704 somehow "nullifies or impairs" a negotiated tariff concession."9
In addition, proponents of reclassification refute the position that
reclassifying multi-purpose vehicles under HTSUS heading 8704 violates
American obligations under the Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System (HCCN) because they contend that while this system
requires contracting parties to adjust their respective tariffs to the
HCCN's terms and conditions, it merely requires the United States to
observe ordinary tariff classification nomenclature and does not "direct
national authorities on specific classification decisions."
198. AMmCAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 187, at 2. If the Japanese raised such a complaint, the contracting parties could conclude that the classification nullifies or impairs a negotiated tariff concession on automobiles and permit
the Japanese to suspend or withdraw comparable tariff concessions. Id. at 3. Under
GATT Article XXVII, a contracting party is entitled to withhold or withdraw trade
concessions:
Any contracting party shall at any time be free to withhold or to withdraw in
whole or in part of any concession, provided for in the appropriate Schedule
annexed to this Agreement, in respect of which such contracting party determines that it was initially negotiated with a government which has not become,
or has ceased to be, a contracting party. A contracting party taking such action
shall notify the Contracting Parties and, upon request, consult with contracting
parties which have a substantial interest in the product conccrned.
GATT, supra note 186, art. XXVII.
199. AMERiCAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 187, at 3. Under this
scenario, a GATT panel would consider whether the objecting government had a
reasonable expectation during the prior GATI"negotiations with the United States that
led the objecting government to believe that the United States would only impose a
2.5% rather than a 25% duty on imported multi-purpose vehicles. Id. The proponents
also believe that a GATT panel could not support such a claim because: (1) foreign
motor vehicle producers have advertised that MPVs [multi-purpose vehicles] are not
cars since at least 1971; (2) importers have classified MPVs as both cars and trucks
throughout the 1980s; (3) some Japanese MPV producers even asked the United States
Customs Service in 1988 to classify as "trucks" certain vehicles that are now classified as "cars." ANERICAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, REINSTATING
THE ORIGINAL U.S. CUSTOMS MPV CLASSIFICATION RUUNG IS ALLOWED UNDER
GATT RULES 1 (1993).
200. AMERICAN AUTOMOBII.E MANUFACTURERS, supra note 187, at 3. While the
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Furthermore, while the HCCN has an established mechanism for the
settlement of disputes through consultation and negotiation under Article
10, recommendations become binding on the parties only if they both
agree in advance to be bound by the Harmonized System Committee's
determination. 1 Consequently, if the United States failed to agree on
a binding review of its classification decisions, any determination made
by the Harmonized System Committee is considered non-binding and
strictly advisory in nature.' If, therefore, the United States refuses to
submit to a binding review, then the Japanese government could attempt
to raise the matter under the dispute resolution procedures of GATT Article XXII/.2 °3 Finally, proponents of reclassification assert that these
dispute resolution procedures were designed to address tariff classification issues after the ratification of the HCCN, and the failure to address
multi-purpose vehicle classification as a potentially divisive issue during
the GATT negotiation process precludes its present consideration as a
violation of either the GATT or the HCCN. °4

B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MULTI-PURPOSE
VEHICLE RECLASSIFICATION

Opponents of multi-purpose vehicle reclassification maintain that reclassification constitutes a prima facie violation of several GATT provisions, an inconsistent interpretation of multi-purpose vehicle tariff classification as motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons under the HCCN, and an incompatible position in light of the
ongoing American commitment to international trade reform through the
continued reduction and elimination of tariffs worldwide.0 5 More speUnited States is required to follow certain general guidelines regarding tariff classification of imported motor vehicles, it retains the sovereign right to determine specifically
whether multi-purpose vehicles actually fall under HTSUS heading 8704 for the transport of goods, or under HTSUS heading 8703 for the transport of persons. Id.
201. Id. at 3-4.
202. Id. at 4; see CLASSIFICATION OF MPVS AND MINIVANS, supra note 190, at I
(stating that the HCCN Committee's rules are merely advisory in nature and do not
obligate a signatory party to adopt its classification scheme for specific products).
203. AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 187, at 4-5; see id. at
5 (identifying GATT Article XXII as an available means of addressing HCCN Tariff
classification issues). According to proponents of reclassification, the intent of the
GATT Article XXIII negotiations was to identity and solve problems associated with
the HCCN and not to preclude national governments from exercising their sovereign
right and discretion on classification issues. Id. at 4.
204. Id. at 4-5.

205. Letter from William C. Duncan, General Director, Japan Automobile Manu-
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cifically, opponents of multi-purpose vehicle reclassification argue that
any attempt to reclassify these vehicles would violate a number of
GATT Articles, including GATT Article I, Article II, and Article
2 6
XXIII.

1. MPV Reclassification Would Violate GATT Article I
Opponents argue that reclassification of multi-purpose vehicles violates
the Most Favored Nation (MEN) provisions of GAIT Article I, which
requires all contracting parties to afford the same tariff treatment given
to one country's product to all other "like products from all contracting
parties."
Contracting parties may not use their tariff classification
system to discriminate against exports of "like products" produced by
other contracting parties. Furthermore, opponents contend that since
passenger cars, sport utility vehicles, minivans and station wagons are
considered "like products" under the GAIT, the non-discrimination
provision of Article I precludes inconsistent tariff treatment for these
products. Opponents also assert that as the largest exporter of multifacturers Association, to Lloyd Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury 1 (April 21, 1993);
see

JAPAN

AUTOMOBILE

MANUFACTURERS

ASSOCIATION,

JAMA

MPV

RE-

CLASSIFICATION POSION PAPER 11 (1993) [hereinafter JAPAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTuRERs] (stating that there is a commitment that countries refrain from any GATT
violative actions during the Uruguay Round negotiations and resist "any trade restrictive or distorting measure inconsistent with the provisions of the General Agreement
or the Instrument negotiated within the framework of GATT or under its auspices,")
citing Punta Del Este Declaration of 1986; Hiroshi Nakamae, Unfairest trader of them
all? It's the U.S., says MITI panel; Link disclaimed between results, fairness, THE
NuCE WKLY., May 17, 1993, at 2 (stating that the MITI report indicates that U.S.
efforts to reclassify minivans would constitute an "arbitrary reclassification of tariff
rates" and is therefore illegal under the GATT).
206. JAPAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 205, at 2.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. According to opponents of reclassification, for tariff classification purposes, "like products" only need possess "similar qualities" and need not be "identical"
or "equal." Id. To support this view, opponents of reclassification assert that the United States is the only remaining industrial power which believes that certain two-door
and four-door multi-purpose vehicles should be classified as trucks under HTSUS
heading 8704 rather than as passenger vehicles under HTSUS heading 8703. Id. In
addition, opponents insist that multi-purpose vehicles such as minivans, two-door and
four-door sport utility vehicles are "principally designed for the transport of persons"
under HTSUS heading 8703 and not motor vehicles for the transport of goods under
HTSUS heading 8704 because of their "end-uses" and "physical characteristics." Id.
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purpose vehicles to the United States, reclassification is
disproportionately burdensome and inherently discriminatory against
Japan and is therefore a violation of the non-discrimination and "equal
treatment" provisions of GATT Article .2"0 Finally, opponents of reclassification content that because an Article I violation constitutes a
"nullification and impairment of a GATT benefit," Japan has the right to
seek compensation, to request the formation of a GATT panel, and the
implementation of dispute resolution procedures under GATT Article
21
XXIII.

210. Id. at 7.
211. Id.; see Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks By Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, GATT Doc. LU6304 (Mar. 22, 1988) (requesting the Article XXIII:2 panel dispute mechanism and recommending to Canada that it take reasonable measures in order for its provisional liquor boards to comply with the provisions of the GAT agreement); see also Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon, GATT Doc. L/6268 (Mar. 22, 1988) (requesting the Article
XXII:2 panel dispute mechanism and requiring Canada to bring its current practices
regarding the export of unprocessed salmon and herring into conformity with the
GATT agreement); Japan-Trade in Semi-conductors, GATT Doc. L16309 (May 4,
1988) (requesting the Article XXIII:2 panel dispute mechanism and finding that Japan
must take steps to bring the sale of its semi-conductors into conformity with the
provisions of the GATT agreement); Japan-Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, GATT Doc. U6253 (Mar. 22, 1988) (requesting the Article XXIII:2
panel dispute mechanism and requiring Japan to eliminate agricultural quantitative restrictions raised by the United States in this panel); Republic of Korea Restrictions on
Imports of Beef, GATT Doc. L/6504 (Nov. 7, 1989) (complaint by Australia) (requesting the Article XXIII:2 panel dispute mechanism, requiring Korea to eliminate illegal
beef import practices, and inviting consultations with the United States and other
contracting parties to establish a time table for the elimination of restrictive practices
on the import of foreign beef into Korea); United States Restrictions on Imports of
Sugar, GATI" Doc. L16514 (June 22, 1989) (requesting the Article XXIII:2 panel
dispute mechanism and declaring United States restrictions on the importation of sugar
pursuant to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) inconsistent with GATT
Article I:1); European Economic Community Regulation on Imports of Parts and
Components, GATT Doc. U6657 (May 16, 1990) (requesting the Article XXII:2
panel dispute mechanism and finding EEC anti-circumvention duties charged to Japanese products subject to anti-dumping duties inconsistent with GAT Article I:2);
United States Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork From Canada,
GATT Doc. DS7/R (July 11, 1991) (requesting the Article XXII:2 panel dispute
mechanism and offering the United States the option of reimbursement or determining
the effect of United States subsidies on the price of Canadian pork).
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2. MPV Reclassification Would Violate GAIT Article 11
Critics of reclassification charge that reclassification of multi-purpose
vehicles constitutes a violation of the GATT Article II provisions on
previously agreed upon bound rate tariff concessions .because, in agreeing to such tariff reduction concessions, the United States and other
contracting parties have committed themselves to institute "no more than
the negotiated tariff rate specified in [their] tariff schedule."' 2" Removal of such barriers is an integral part of the GATT's overall plan for a
negotiated reduction in all tariffs worldwide in order to expand international trade."'
While the United States agreed to reduce its tariff rate on motor
vehicles for the transport of persons to a 2.5% rate during the Tokyo
Round negotiations,"1 4 the United States bound the tariff rate for multipurpose vehicles at the higher 25% rate at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations in December 1994.25 Binding the tariff at
this 25% rate, however, does not necessarily mean that the products in
212. JAPAN AUTOMOBIIE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 205, at 2-3. GATr Article
11:1(b) provides certain customs concessions for contracting parties:
The products described in Part I of the Schedule, relating to any contracting
party, which are the products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on
their importation into the territory . . . be exempt from ordinary customs duties
in excess of those set forth and provided for therein.
GATr, supra note 186, art. Il(b).
213. See President's Uruguay Round Submission, supra note 7 (stating that one of
the principal United States negotiating objectives during the Uruguay Round was the
promotion of "more open, equitable and reciprocal market access" and the reduction
or elimination of all barriers to trade and other trade distorting practices); see also
Job Fairness and Trade Equity Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 3250 Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Mfeans, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) (statement of the American International Automobile Dealers Association) (asserting that raising the tariff from 2.5% to 25% is illegal under the GAIT and is
inconsistent with the United States objective to reduce or eliminate tariffs reciprocally
worldwide).
214. JAPAN AUTOMOBIIE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 205, at 3-4 (stating that a
1,000% increase in the bound tariff rate from 2.5% to 25% is illegal under the
GATT because it would exceed the current bound tariff rate of 2.5%).
215. See Proclamation No. 6763, To Implement the Trade Agreements Resulting
From the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and for Other Purposes,
60 Fed. Reg. 1007, 1419 (1994) (binding the duty rate for motor vehicles for the
transport of goods at 25% under the terms of the implementing legislation for the
Uruguay Round Agreements).
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question will be dutiable at the 25% rate.2" 6 While the United States,
as a GATT contracting party, reserves the right to raise the tariff on
these vehicles up to a maximum 25% rate, it will be constrained from
doing so if multi-purpose vehicles and minivans were entering the United States at a lower tariff rate at the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations, strengthening the importing country's "reasonable expectation"
27
that its vehicles will remain dutiable at the lower 2.5% tariff rate.
Furthermore, binding the tariff rate at 25% does not have an impact
on existing principles regarding customs classification as interpreted by
United States courts.2 '8 As demonstrated in the Marubeni decision,
United States courts have the statutory authority to change the classification of multi-purpose vehicles based on existing statutory classification
interpretations, legal precedent, and customs principles.1 9
3.

MPV Reclassification Would Be Actionable Under GATT Article

In addition to violations under the GATT Articles I and II, opponents
argue that multi-purpose vehicle reclassification also is actionable under
GATT Article XXII. =' This provision is similar to their GATT Article I analysis in that it hinges on the Japanese government's "reasonable expectation[]" that the United States would continue to afford the
same tariff treatment to multi-purpose vehicles before and after the
negotiated Tokyo Round tariff concessions.' Consequently, opponents
216. Telephone Interview with Steve Falken, Director, Aerospace and Automobiles,
Office of The United States Trade Representative (Mar. 24, 1995).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. JAPAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 205, at 7-8.
221. Id. at 8; see Cassidy Letter, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that the most likely
standard for determining whether an action is a non-violation, nullification or impairment of another country's benefits is "whether that signatory had reason to expect, at
the time it negotiated the GATT concession . . . that a subsequent . . . measure

would impair those benefits"). Moreover, opponents maintain that many other countries
classify multi-purpose vehicles as cars rather than as trucks and that before the 1989
Customs Service's reclassification decision, the United States had consistently classified
two- and four-door multi-purpose vehicles as cars and not trucks in its tariff schedules. Id. As a result, the Japanese automobile industry believes that it had a "reasonable expectation" that two-door multi-purpose vehicles with rear seats would continue
to be classified as passenger cars and remain dutiable at the lower 2.5% tariff rate.
Id. According to opponents of reclassification, this expectation was reinforced by the

1995]

RECLASSIFICATION AND DUMPING DISPUTES

1161

contend that any reclassification would thus hinder Japan's expectation
that multi-purpose vehicles would receive the same tariff treatment both
before and after the tariff concession negotiationsmt '
4. MPV Reclassification Would Be Inconsistent With United States
HCCN Obligations
Furthermore, opponents charge that the United States is not meeting
its obligations under the HCCN.m Since the United States, as a contracting party, has specifically agreed to harmonize its tariff schedules
with the HCCN and to "use all the headings and subheadings of the
Harmonized System without addition or modification," opponents assert
that the United States is required to adjust its tariff schedules-including
HTSUS heading 8703 ("[m]otor cars or motor vehicles principally de-

Harmonized System Committee's overwhelming determination in 1989 that two-door
sport utility vehicles are properly classified as motor vehicles "principally designed for
the transport of persons" under HTSUS heading 8703. JAPAN AUTMOB.ILE MANUFACTURERS, supra note 205, at 10. But see AmRICAN AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS,
supra note 187, at 2-3 (stating that a GATT panel is not likely to conclude that the
Japanese government's expectations concerning the classification of multi-purpose vehicles during the Tokyo Round negotiations are sufficient to warrant a finding of a
nullification or impairment of a benefit under GATT Article XXIII).
222. JAPAN AUTOMOBILE MANuFACTuRERS, supra note 205, at 8. GATT panels
have consistently interpreted Article XXIM(1)(b) to prevent one contracting party from
undermining the reasonable expectations of another contracting party, particularly when
such expectations were the result of tariff binding negotiations. Id. at 9; see European
Economic Community Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples, GAIT Doc. LJ6491
(June 22, 1989) (complaint by Chile) (stating that the GATT panel "concurred with
the view that Article XI protected expectations of the contracting parties as to competitive conditions, not trade volumes"); see also United States--Restrictions on Imports of Sugar, GATT Doc. U6514 (June 22, 1989) (explaining that the panel had

found "all restrictions imposed by the United States on the importation of sugar under
the authority of the Headnote of the Tariff Schedules of the United States to be
inconsistent with the General Agreement independent of the quota allocation to specific countries") (emphasis in original); Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, GATT Doc. U.6627 (Jan.
25, 1990) (finding that the "benefits accruing to the United States ...

were impaired

as a result of the introduction of production subsidy schemes which operate to ...
prevent the tariff concessions from having any impact on the competitive relationship
between domestic and imported oilseeds").
223. JAPAN AUTOMOBILUE MANuFACrURERS, supra note 205, at 9-11. According to

opponents of multi-purpose vehicle reclassification, the HCCN "provides a standardized
nomenclature designed to function as the 'core' for national tariff systems." Id. at 10.
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signed for the transport of persons") and HTSUS heading 8704
("[m]otor vehicles for the transport of goods")-to comply with the
HCCN's tariff classification systemY 4 Given the parallel construction
of the language of the HCCN and the HTSUS, opponents firmly believe
that the United States would have a difficult time defending multi-purpose vehicle reclassification before a GATT panel as permissible under
GATT Articles I and I.' Considering the United States Court of International Trade's recent interpretation of the HTSUS and its reversal of
the 1989 Customs Service decision to reclassify two-door sport utility
vehicles from 2.5% to 25% ad valorem,226 it is unlikely that a GATT
dispute resolution panel would view multi-purpose vehicle reclassification in a favorable light, and such a panel could hold that it is a violation of MFN treatment under GATT Article I and bound tariff rate
treatment under GATT Article I1.27
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Any attempt to reclassify multi-purpose vehicles would place the
United States in the uncomfortable position of having to defend such a
policy when it has reaffirmed soundly its commitment to seek broad
tariff reductions in concluding the Uruguay Round and its clear endorsement of implementing stronger dispute resolution reforms that provide
for a more timely review and stricter procedures for the settlement of
GATT disputes under Article XXIII.' Although the Clinton Adminis-

224. Id. at 9-11.

225. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text (discussing the illegality of
reclassification under GATT Articles I and I1); see also Richard H. Steinberg, The
Uruguay Round: A Legal Analysis of the Final Act, at 63, 64 (1994) (discussing the

implementation of stronger, and more binding dispute settlement resolution procedures
at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round such as: integrated dispute settlement procedures; cross-retaliation as a result of a favorable panel determination; more timely
review for hearing and resolving disputes; and automatic adoption procedures for
GATT panel reports unless there is a consensus against their adoption).
226. See Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 1521, 1522-23 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 530 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reversing the 1989 Customs
Service Classification of two-door sport utility vehicles at a 25% tariff rate).
227. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text (discussing the illegality of
multi-purpose vehicle reclassification under GATI Articles I and II).
228. See 2 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, April 1992 UNITED
STATES TRADE POLICY REviEw (1992) (Opening Statement by the Representative of

the United States) (expressing concern of the United States about "the increasing
tendency of some groups to advocate protectionism and less trade as a solution" and
stating that the United States has "sought cooperation rather than conflict in [its] bi-
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tration stands to gain much political mileage if it decides to take on this
issue,' the American consumer will bear the costs of such a policy in
the long run with higher priced minivans and multi-purpose vehicles.3

lateral disputes . . . and shown (its] respect for the multilateral system by bringing

disputes to the GATT); see also President's Uruguay Round Submission, supra note
7, at 2163 (discussing the commitment of the United States to establish more effective dispute resolution mechanisms).
229. See Peter Grier, U.S., Japan Stalemate on Trade Spins Toward Retaliation,
THE CHtUSTIAN SCL MoNrroR, Feb. 14, 1994. at 1 (stating that both the United

States and Japan will win support on the domestic political front by maintaining a
tough negotiating position); see also Marc Levinson & Rich Thomas, The Noise is the
News, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 1993, at 40 (stating that while the Clinton Administration
has talked aggressively on trade issues-including minivan and multi-purpose vehicle
reclassification-it is uncertain whether this strong stance will lead to concrete action
on this issue).
230. See Max Gates, Senate Mulls Import Tariff on Minivans, Sport Utilities, AU-

NEws, Mar. 9, 1992, at 1 (stating that reclassifying minivans and four-door
sport utility vehicles would hurt the American consumer in the form of a S1,500 to
TOMOTIVE

$6,000 increase in vehicle prices); see also Jack McLean, Big Problem with Minivan

Prices, AUTOWEEK, Sept. 14, 1992, at 11 (stating that the United States automobile
industry's usual response to protection from Japanese imported vehicles is to increase
their own vehicle prices to achieve greater profits at the expense of the consumer);
The War That Has No Winners; How to Avoid a Wingding Trade War With Japan,

L.A. Tms, Feb. 16, 1994, at B6 (stating that a trade war is not only damaging to
the United States and Japan, it inevitably has a harsh impact on consumers due to an
increase in prices); Japan Official Blasts Push to Raise Minivan Tariff, VALL ST. J.,

Mar. 9, 1993, at B6 (reporting that Japan's Ambassador to the United States called
the proposal to raise the tariff on imported minivans "an unfair tax on the American
middle class"); When is a Truck Not a Truck?, CONSUMER REP., May 1989, at 330
(asserting that an increase in tariffs would lead to a similar result as the voluntary
restraint agreements of the early 1980s, namely a dramatic increase in the price of
imported and domestic vehicles). In 1984, Japanese cars sold for 22.617o more than
they would have without quotas. Id. When the United States and Japan negotiated the
voluntary restraint agreements (VRA) in the early 1980s, rather than maintaining prices to gain market share, the United States automobile industry raised its prices in
order to increase short-term profits. Id. As a result, it is estimated that during the
first four years of the voluntary restraint agreements, American consumers paid S16
billion more for automobiles due to the large price differential between Japanese
automobiles and their American counterparts. Id. But see Robert Kuttner, Protectionism: In the Right Dose, a Cure, WASH. PoST, July 7, 1992, at A19 (asserting that

despite the conventional economic wisdom that quotas or negotiated restraints lead to
economic inefficiency in the domestic industry and higher consumer prices, the protection afforded by the voluntary restraint agreements in the 1980s actually led to a
revitalized United States automobile industry); Geoff Sundstrom, Vans, Utilities Socked
With a 25% Tariff, AtrroMoTwVE NEws, Jan. 9, 1989, at I (stating that Japanese
manufacturers benefitted from "flexible classification" of multi-purpose vehicles be-
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If the Clinton Administration decides to make multi-purpose vehicle

reclassification a political priority, it will face an uphill battle not only
from foreign lobbyists and the Japanese government, but also from a

domestic legal system that already has rejected such earlier efforts"
and from a newly negotiated GATT mechanism that provides for more
effective and expeditious dispute resolution." 2 Japan, which prefers to
handle such trade issues on a bilateral basis,"3 is so confident in its
position that it has threatened to invoke the GATT dispute settlement
mechanism if the United States attempts to reclassify multi-purpose
vehicles." 4 The stronger dispute settlement procedures negotiated at the
close of the Uruguay Round in 1994 will reinforce this confidence." 5

cause by inserting a back seat into these vehicles, it enabled them to export additional vehicles to the United States independently of their passenger car quota under the
voluntary restraint agreements).
231. Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 1521 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1993), affd, 35 F.3d 530 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
232. See President's Uruguay Round Submission, supra note 7, at 2163-64 (discussing the strict time limits for each phase of the dispute settlement process (16
months), the right to a GATT panel, the presumption that panel reports will be adopted unless there is a consensus to repudiate the report, and the requirement that a contacting party bring its laws into compliance with its GATT obligations or face retaliation from the complaining party).
233. See Satoshi Isaka, GATT Pact Seen Helping Japan Settle Trade Disputes, THE
NIKKEI WKLY., Dec. 20, 1993, at 1 (stating that in the future the Japanese government will rely on bilateral rather than multilateral negotiations for the settlement of
trade disputes); Hiroshi Nakamae, supra note 205, at 2 (stating that while the Japanese support "mutual efforts" to address unfair trade policies, if it decides to pursue
unilateral action, then the GATT dispute settlement process is "the sole objective
forum able to prevent emotional retaliations among trade partners").
234. See Mark Magnier, Japan Threatens to Go to GA7T if U.S. Boosts Minivan
Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993, at A3 (discussing Japanese threats to bring a
GATT action if the United States raises tariffs on imported minivans from 2.5% to
25%); see also Hiroshi Nakamae, supra note 205, at 2 (citing a MM report encouraging the use of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism as an objective means of
resolving trade disputes and preventing any unwanted retaliatory action); David Holley,
Japan Calls U.S. Trade Threat Regrettable; Commerce: Japanese Official Says U.S.
Suggestion That it Might Impose Sanctions Won't Help Foster Trust, L.A. TIMEs, Jan.
14, 1994, at D2 (stating Japan's willingness to invoke the GATT dispute settlement
procedures because of the significant protection afforded to an injured party under the
new Uruguay Round Agreement); Satoshi Isaka, supra note 233, at I (reporting that
the Uruguay Round's more stringent and structured trade dispute settlement procedures
are the "single most important benefit for Japan" which could lead to a "fundamental
shift" in Japan's approach to resolving trade disputes with the United States).
235. President's Uruguay Round Submission, supra note 7, at 2163.
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Because of its disposition in the United States courts, it appears unlikely that the United States could argue successfully its case before a
GATT dispute settlement panel? 6 Furthermore, as a GATT" contracting
party, the United States is required to abide by its international obligation to honor other contracting parties' "reasonable expectations" at the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations regarding the tariff rate
for specific brand name multi-purpose vehicles and minivans which
entered the United States market at the time of the Uruguay Round
negotiations and were classified at the lower 2.5% rate.m New multipurpose vehicle models not mentioned in the tariff schedules and exported to the United States after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round will
be subject to the higher 25% rate because it will be more difficult from
an international standpoint for the importing country to demonstrate its
"reasonable expectation" that the newly introduced vehicle should be
dutiable at the lower 2.5%.8

Despite this ongoing international obligation and in light of the new
25% bound rate for multi-purpose vehicles under HTSUS heading 8704,
United States courts, such as the Court of International Trade in
Marubeni, will continue to rule on multi-purpose vehicle classification
issues by taking into consideration existing statutory classification, customs principles, and legal precedent 9 Although it remains uncertain
how future cases will unfold, it seems likely that existing multi-purpose
vehicle models the HTSUS lists heading and the end of the Uruguay
Round classified at the 2.5% rate will continue to be classified at the
lower 2.5% rate. Newer vehicles, however, may be susceptible to the
higher tariff rate, unless the exporting country can argue before a GATT
panel that it had a "reasonable expectation" that its vehicle should be
classified at the lower tariff rate or convince a United States court that
the vehicle's structural and non-structural design features more closely
resemble a passenger vehicle under HTSUS heading 8703 rather than a
cargo or goods carrying vehicle under HTSUS heading 8704."
Given United States minivan industry's strong market position,2 '
236. See supra notes 207-27 and accompanying text (discussing the GAIT illegal
nature of reclassification and the unlikelihood for success under the GATr dispute

resolution process).
237. Interview With Steve Falken, supra note 216.
238. Id.

239. Id.
240. See supra notes 74-94 and accompanying text (discussing the basis for over-

ruling the Customs Service's classification of the twodoor Nissan Pathinder).
241. See A Vehicle to Ditch, BOSTON GLOBE, May 3. 1993, at 10 (stating that the
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President Clinton should reexamine whether the short-term political and
rather limited economic gains outweigh equally important economic and

diplomatic costs that are associated with pursuing such an action." 2
Because it is important to sustain and promote free trade principles on a
worldwide scale, the United States should refrain from raising the multipurpose vehicle reclassification issue as well as other tariff reclassification issues unless an American industry is actually threatened by or
experiencing a material injury.243 More importantly, as a major actor in
international trade, the United States has an obligation to abide by the
terms and conditions of the GATI'.2" If the United States truly stands
for free trade, it should not place short-term and rather limited political
considerations before its more important long-term international commitment 5to improve and enhance international cooperation on trade issues.

24

United States dominates the American minivan market, with a United States market
share that is estimated to be over 85%); see also Welfare Compromise for Auto Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1993, at A22 (reporting that the United States automobile
industry "controls over 90% of the domestic minivan market" and would benefit dramatically from a tariff rate increase in the form of higher profits from the sale of its
own minivans); Dumping on U.S. Consumers, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 1992, at 628
(stating that although the United States automobile industry controls more than 90%
of the $9 billion minivan market, it continues to fight for additional protection
through dumping actions and multi-purpose vehicle reclassification efforts); Commerce
Department Final Determination Finds that Japan Dumps Minivans in U.S., Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA), May 27, 1992 (stating that the United States automobile industry
controls over 90% of the domestic minivan market); Gates, supra note 230, at I

(same).
242. See Max Gates, Clinton to Decide Minivan Tariffs, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, May
3, 1993, at 8 (stating that the President should consider using the reclassification issue
as leverage in order to obtain concessions in trade negotiations with the Japanese).
243. See A Vehicle to Ditch, supra note 241, at 10 (asserting that tariff disputes
should be reserved to areas where there is a real injury to American consumers and
the overall domestic industry).
244. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 (1987) (stating that a rule of international law or international agreement derives its authority as law because of its very nature as a binding legal obligation of the United States).
245. See President's Uruguay Round Submission, supra note 7, at 2154 (lauding
the creation of a new international trade system that will guarantee the systematic and
impartial expansion of world trade).

